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Introduction
In his 1996 State of the Union Address, President Clinton
declared: "The era of big Government is over."' By that, he meant
that the government would no longer implement its policy goals
through massive federal spending programs. What he did not say was
that, as a result, federal policy would be increasingly dependent on
2
indirect funding.
The Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter "Code"), at least in the

eyes of the President and Congress, has apparently become the

vehicle of choice for disbursing government funds.3 Congressionally

imposed restrictions on direct government expenditures, in particular
the pay-as-you-go provisions in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,
have significantly contributed to this trend.4 In 1998, the federal
government spent more money through the Code than through the

discretionary appropriations process.5 The tax law's traditional
revenue-raising function is being eclipsed as it becomes a principal
tool of federal policy.
Policymakers and scholars have long recognized that direct6
spending programs and tax subsidies can be economically equivalent.
The Code can provide a subsidy by authorizing taxpayers to keep part
1. President's State of the Union Address, 1996-1 PUB. PAPERS 79 (Jan. 23, 1996).
2. Many of the government's goals are now accomplished by encouraging private
citizens and corporations to engage in particular activities and support certain causes in
exchange for substantial tax reductions. Indirect funding of federal policies also comes
from sources outside the federal government, for example, in the form of unfunded
mandates and regulation of private activity.
3. See, e.g., Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (containing
tax breaks for education, children, and retirement). The 105th Congress introduced a
variety of bills that would subsidize favored activities through the Code. See, e.g., H.R.
3475, 105th Cong. (1998) (allowing deduction for health insurance costs of all individuals
not eligible for employer-subsidized health plans); H.R. 3135, 105th Cong. (1998)
(increasing amount of dependent care expenses creditable); H.R. 1164, 105th Cong.
(1997)(providing credit for pollution control by taxpayers engaged in agriculture-related
activities).
4. For a discussion of the pay-as-you-go provisions and its effects on the tax law, see
Elizabeth Garrett, HarnessingPolitics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI.L. REV. 501 (1998).
5. The Office of Management and Budget (hereinafter "OMB") estimated that the
federal government spent approximately $553 billion in appropriations and $566 billion by
foregoing tax revenue. These numbers do not include amounts that the government spent
on social security, Medicare, Medicaid and interest on the national debt. The estimated
total outlay for 1998, including discretionary and mandatory spending was $1,693A billion.
See ANALYTICAL PERSPECrHVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 1998, at 249 [hereinafter ANALYrICAL PERSPECTIVES]. Five hundred
sixty-six billion dollars was the total in the revenue loss portion of the OMB's Tax
Expenditure Budget. See iL at 73-75.
6. See 1968 REP., SECRETARY TREASURY 326. See also Bernard Wolfman, Federal
Tax Policyand the Support ofScience, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 171 (1965).
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of the tax they would otherwise owe to the government. The
mechanisms for tax-based subsidies are exclusions, deductions, and
credits. Exclusions operate as subsidies to the extent of the foregone
tax, equal to the taxpayer's marginal rate applied to the excluded
amounts. Examples of such exclusions are the exclusion from gross
income of housing allowances received by ministers,7 the exclusion
from employee income of the cost of employer-provided health
insurance,8 and the exclusion of de minimis fringe benefits.9 Like
exclusions, deductions operate as subsidies to the extent of the
foregone tax, equal to the taxpayer's marginal rate applied to the
deductible amount. An example of a deduction that operates as a
subsidy to the extent of the taxpayer's marginal rate is the deduction
allowed for home mortgage interest, I.R.C. §163(h). Unlike
exclusions and deductions, tax credits operate as subsidies to the full
extent of the dollar amount of the credit. An example of a credit that
operates as a subsidy is the HOPE educational credit, which allows
taxpayers to offset their tax liability by a portion of their educational
expenses. 10 While these three mechanisms operate differently, each
one allows the taxpayer to reduce the tax liability she would have had
in the absence of the provision.
Every year the government publishes a "tax expenditure
budget,"" which, like the official federal budget, quantifies
government funds "spent" (according to tax expenditure theory) as a
result of exclusions, deductions and credits contained in the Code.
The tax expenditure budget identifies only certain provisions of the
Code as equivalent to spending
programs; it excludes so-called
"structural" tax provisions.12 A provision is structural, the theory
holds, if it exists to accurately measure "income." Structural
provisions are not "tax expenditures," and are not considered
7. I.R.C. § 107.
8. I.R.C. § 106.
9. I.R.C. § 132.
10. I.R.C. § 25A.
11. In fact, it publishes two. The OMB publishes one and the Joint Committee on
Taxation publishes the other. See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 71-98;
JOINT COMMrITEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR

FISCAL YEARS 1998-2002, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 15, 1997, available in WESTLAW,
97 TNT 241-44 [hereinafter JOINT COMMrIrEE BUDGET]. The Joint Committee's tax
expenditure list is similar, but not identical to the list prepared by the President's office.
See JOINT COMMITTEE BUDGET, supra, paras. 56-60 (describing differences between OMB
and Joint Committee budgets).
12. For example, the deduction allowed for ordinary and necessary business expenses
under Code section 162 is a structural provision because it allows taxpayers to deduct the
costs of producing income in determining net income subject to tax. It would be possible
to quantify the revenue that could be raised from repealing structural provisions of the
Code.
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13
equivalent to spending programs under tax expenditure theory.
However, as will be discussed, distinguishing structural provisions

from tax expenditures
14
controversy.

has been the source

of considerable

The basic insight of tax expenditure analysis is very simple: there
is no economic distinction between the government's direct subsidy of
an activity or institution and its grant of an equivalent tax break for
that activity or institution. When the government fails to tax, it is
expending resources just as surely as when it sends a check.
Proponents of tax expenditure analysis maintain that the economic
equivalence of tax expenditures and direct expenditures requires that
there should not be any legal distinction between them.'5 They would
subject tax expenditures to the full panoply of constitutional and
statutory restrictions on government spending. I will refer to this
approach as the "strong version" of tax expenditure analysis.
Proponents of this view ask: From a constitutional standpoint, why
should it matter whether the government directly funds religious
schools or gives a tax break to parents for tuition to such schools?
Put this way, the argument is appealingly simple. Opponents have
claimed that the tax expenditure concept is not useful. Some have
argued that it lacks a normative foundation, 6 others that the
impossibility of determining precisely what should be included in the
tax expenditure budget undermines its value,17 and still others that it
notion that the government is entitled to all of a
relies on the absurd
18
taxpayer's money.
13. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REFORM 17 (1973) [hereinafter
SURREY, PATHWAYS]; STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAx
EXPENDITURES 3 (1985) [hereinafter SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES].
14. See Part I.B. infra.
15. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supranote 13, at 118-19; Donna
D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the Courts: The Use of Tax
Expenditure Analysis in JudicialDecision Making, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 855 (1993).
16. See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of PersonalDeductions in the Income Tax, 40
HASTINGS L. J. 343, 345-66 (1989).
17. See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969) [hereinafter Bittker, Tax Subsidies]. The debate over
the tax expenditure concept has pitted two of the greatest tax scholars against one
another, Stanley Surrey in favor, see SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 13; SURREY &
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 13; Stanley S. Surrey & William F.
Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to ProfessorBittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J.
528 (1969), and Boris Bittker against, see Bittker, Tax Subsidies, supra; Boris I. Bittker,
The Tax ExpenditureBudget-A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J.
538, (1969) [hereinafter Surrey & Hellmuth]. Undoubtedly they are both right.
18. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 57 (3d ed. 1995) (excerpting Editorial, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20,
1975). This editorial characterizes tax expenditures as reductions in tax, rather than
government spending.
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The

Supreme

Court

rekindled

interest

9

constitutionalization of tax expenditure analysis 20
decision in United States v. Virginia (VMI). 21 VMI

in

the

with its 1996
raises the very
question at the heart of the tax expenditure debate: Should
economically equivalent government support be treated as legally
equivalent?

In VMI, the Supreme Court decided that Virginia's

policy of admitting only men to the Virginia Military Institute-a
state-operated

and state-funded institution-violated

the equal

protection clause of the Constitution- The implications of the VMI
decision depend upon how one views government support for private
single-sex education. If VMI means that the government is barred
from participating in any way in single-sex education, then the public
support-including tax-based support-that flows to private singlesex schools would be constitutionally suspect.3 Proponents of tax
expenditure analysis argue that tax-based support is functionally
equivalent to direct government spending, and should therefore be
constitutionally equivalent.24
Indeed, they believe that this
conclusion is a "matter of logical necessity." 5 Judicial adoption of tax
19. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" ConstitutionallyEquivalent to Direct
Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998); Donald C. Alexander, Validity of Tax
Exemptions and Deductible Contributionsfor Private Single-Sex Schools, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Jan. 11, 1996, availablein WESTLAW, 96 TNT 8-45. For earlier treatments of the
subject, see Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285
(1969); Boris I. Bittker and Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights:
'Constitutionalizing' the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972); Paul R.
McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the
Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAx L. REv. 377 (1972); Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptionsfor
Racially DiscriminatoryReligious Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV.259 (1982).
20. The Supreme Court has been reticent to adopt tax expenditure analysis as a basis
for constitutional decisionmaking, despite repeated invitations. The Court has shown that
it clearly understands the economic equivalence of tax subsidies and direct subsidies. See
Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980);
Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,690 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
21. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
22. Id. at 534. The majority declared that the state would be required to furnish an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for government action that differentiates on the
basis of gender. Id. at 531.
23. Government support flows to private schools in many ways, including, for
example, funds under Title IX, Civil Rights Act of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
(1994) (requiring a "sex blind" approach to funding and decisions in educational
institutions), government guaranteed loans to pay student tuition, and tax benefits in
various forms. The exemption from tax allowed to gender-segregated institutions under
Code section 501(c)(3) does not clearly provide an economic benefit to those schools
because even without the exemption, they might not have any taxable income.
24. See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 13, at 40; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 13, at 118-19.
25. Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L. REv.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.50

expenditure analysis could mean that the VMI decision directly
dictates the treatment of tax-based support to private single-gender
institutions. If state financial support (not just state operation of the
university) made VMI vulnerable, 26 then the deductibility of
schools as Smith and Wellesley would
contributions to such single-sex
27
also be unconstitutional.
This Article reveals the complexity underlying judicial
application of tax expenditure analysis. It adopts what I call a
"qualified version" of tax expenditure analysis: it applauds the
important lessons of tax expenditure analysis for policymaking and
accepts the economic equivalence of certain tax provisions and direct
spending programs 28 and the analytic prescriptions for legislatures
that flow from that equivalence; however, it finds that the strong
version of tax expenditure analysis gives economic equivalence too
much normative force, and that courts have only limited use for the
tax expenditure budget in legal analysis.
My critique of the strong version of tax expenditure analysis is
based on two points: (1) it imposes inappropriate restraints on
adjudication and improperly reduces judicial scrutiny of provisions
that are not classified as tax expenditures, and (2) it gives tax
491,495 (1985) (reviewing SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES).
26. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in VMI provides some support for the argument that
the fact of economic support is itself of constitutional importance. He considered the
state's role in funding VMI to be a key element of the constitutional violation and
believed that the state's substantial underfunding of the proposed parallel women's
institution prevented Virginia's suggested remedy from satisfying constitutional
requirements. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
27. Of course, in order to conclude that deductions for contributions to Smith and
Wellesley are unconstitutional after VMI, one must equate tax-based economic support
not merely with financial support but with public operation of a large and complex
institution. Only if the tax laws place the federal government in the same position vis-A-vis
private sex-segregated schools as was the state of Virginia with respect to public single-sex
education would VMFs precedent directly control the tax benefits. Nevertheless, tax
expenditure analysis places tax provisions on a par with direct spending such that their
constitutionality depends on the distinction between funding and operation. If this
distinction is the source of VMI's constitutional defect, Virginia could cure the defect by
transferring formal control to a private group while continuing full state funding. The
courts have never held that tax-based support is equivalent to direct government
operation of an institution, and as discussed more fully below, evidence of government
intent to discriminate differs greatly for tax-based support compared to direct government
operation. Government intent to discriminate is necessary for a violation of the equal
protection clause. See infra Part II.B.
28. By "economic equivalence," I mean that a recipient receives the same monetary
benefit from a tax program and a direct spending program. I do not mean that the tax and
spending programs are identical in every respect. If they are, then they could not have
different legal statuses under the analysis I propose. I am concerned with programs that
have the same economic effect, but are carried out differently.
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expenditures the same legal consequences as economically equivalent
direct-spending programs, even where the legal standard does not
depend on economic equivalence. Part I identifies the drawbacks of
separating structural, income-defining provisions of the Code from
tax expenditure provisions for purposes of judicial review. Part II
explains why tax expenditures should not always be constitutionally
equivalent to direct-spending programs with the same economic
effect. Economic equivalence is only one factor in the evaluation of a
tax provision; other factors may be more important to the
constitutional standard.
This Article looks at the significance of the similarities and
differences between tax benefits and direct spending for purposes of
the equal protection and establishment clauses, with a particular focus
on the charitable contribution deduction. 29 Because economic
equivalence is not critical under these constitutional provisions, tax
expenditure analysis is not relevant to the legal analysis. 30 While this
Article deals only briefly with numerous provisions of the Code and
analyzes only two constitutional provisions,31 it provides a model for
considering the constitutionality of any tax provision.
The Article begins by defending the qualified version of tax
expenditure analysis, explaining how tax expenditure analysis is well
suited to legislatures but not to courts. The definitional difficulties
inherent in the tax expenditure concept, and the political
manipulability of the tax expenditure budget make tax expenditure
analysis too unreliable for constitutional adjudication, even while it
provides relevant information to legislatures. The strong version of
tax expenditure analysis would constitutionalize the definition of
income and thereby reduce judicial scrutiny of income-defining tax
provisions. Structural provisions, as well as tax expenditures, may
violate constitutional norms, a possibility ignored in most discussions
of the constitutionality of tax provisions.3 2 In addition, the hybrid
nature of the federal income tax presents an external challenge to the
theoretical underpinnings of the tax expenditure concept. 33
29. I.R.C. § 170.
30. Proponents of the strong version of tax expenditure analysis believe that allowing
tax expenditures where economically equivalent direct spending programs would be
constitutionally prohibited elevates form over substance and allows the government to
achieve indirectly what it may not achieve directly. However, these proponents are
correct only if the fact of economic support is constitutionally decisive, which it is not
under the constitutional provisions examined in this Article.
31. Two constitutional provisions are more than enough for one tax professor.
32. See, e.g., SURREY & McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 13; Adler,
supra note 15; Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures:A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155;
Zelinsky, supra note 19.
33. Our federal income tax contains many elements of a consumption tax. See infra
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Turning from the institutional drawbacks of wholesale judicial
adoption of the strong version of tax expenditure analysis, Part II
describes my proposed methodology for examining the
constitutionality of tax benefits. Because of the importance of
government intent under the equal protection and establishment
clauses, the Article describes a model for determining government
intent in tax provisions, explains how to classify and evaluate
different types of tax provisions, and considers the separability of
Because the equal
government intent from taxpayer intent.
protection analysis centers on the intent question and tax-based aid to
discriminatory private organizations is accomplished by means of
broad, entitlement-like provisions, I conclude that tax-based aid that
flows to discriminatory private organizations under the charitable
contribution deduction is constitutional. Consequently, VMI does not
jeopardize the deductibility of contributions to Smith College.
Unfortunately, the tax-deductibility of contributions to racially
discriminatory organizations such as Bob Jones University34 may be
no more constitutionally suspect than those to Smith.35
To address the possible absence of a constitutional impediment
to tax-based support for an organization that racially discriminates,
the Article considers how the analysis of tax provisions might differ
under interpretations of the equal protection clause that have not
been embraced by the Supreme Court. It concludes that any
understanding of the equal protection clause that focuses on the
effects of tax-based support, rather than government intent, would
require that courts treat tax benefits and economically equivalent
direct spending programs the same, along the lines advocated by
proponents of the strong version of tax expenditure analysis.
Comparing the analysis of tax-based aid under the Supreme Court's
current interpretation of the equal protection clause with competing
interpretations illustrates my basic thesis about the applicability of tax
expenditure analysis to constitutional adjudication: the substantive
interests embodied in the constitutional provision determine the
Part I.D.
34. The IRS revoked Bob Jones University's tax exemption because it discriminated
on the basis of race. The Supreme Court upheld the IRS's determination on statutory
grounds. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
35. Different consequences for Bob Jones University and Smith College could arise
under current law if the constitutional analysis gets past the prima facie case, and the court
applies the different standards of strict and intermediate scrutiny to the government's
justification of the Code's provision. For the charitable deduction, the constitutional case
fails at the intent question, so the different standards for race and gender-based
discrimination are likely to be irrelevant. Different results for Bob Jones and Smith could
follow if the Supreme Court decides that race-based distinctions require a unique analysis.
Cf. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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relevance of economic equivalence to constitutional adjudication.
Tax expenditure analysis is helpful only when economic equivalence
is central.
The Article then analyzes tax-based aid to religious organizations
by applying the same methodology and examining the substantive
interests embodied in the establishment clause. In addition to
prohibiting government intent to favor religion, the Supreme Court
has identified other interests protected by the establishment clause
that are absent in equal protection analysis. Therefore, the Article
considers the problem of state entanglement with religion through the
tax law, and whether tax-based support may be considered
constitutionally incidental to the government's secular purpose. It
concludes that taxpayer choice, taxpayer cost, and indirectness of
government support may provide grounds for finding that tax-based
aid to religion would be constitutional where equivalent direct aid
would not. By drawing upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,36 I argue that the Court's
formalism indicates that most of the Justices are unlikely to be
sympathetic to the strong version of tax expenditure analysis in
establishment clause cases. Nevertheless, the Article raises some
constitutional questions about the charitable contribution deduction's
tax-based aid to religion.
The final section of the Article looks beyond the constitutionality
of tax provisions and considers what tax policy can learn from
constitutional scholarship. It questions the narrow limits of the
equality norm that has traditionally been applied in tax policy
discussions and suggests that the tax law offers significant untapped
opportunities to advance constitutional norms.

I. Tax Expenditure Analysis, Legislatures, and Courts
In this section, I argue that the tax expenditure budget suits
Congress' institutional needs, but is problematic if applied
unreflectively as a basis for constitutional adjudication.
A. Institutional Needs of Legislatures and Courts

Tax expenditure analysis has been an immensely important
policymaking tool. It has invited lawmakers and citizens to look at
tax provisions more fully, allowing greater understanding of the
effects of the Code on the behavior of taxpayers, and the options that
the legislature has when choosing to subsidize certain activities. It has
given the government greater control by identifying the non-revenue
raising functions that the tax law serves, and has illuminated the
36. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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richness of the tax law by identifying the Code's central position in
defining the nature of the relationship between government and
citizen in both the collection and disbursement of revenue.
The tax expenditure budget has produced a taxonomy that

allows us to distinguish different functions fulfilled by tax provisions,
encouraging us to compare tax provisions with spending provisions.
It has given a fuller accounting of how the government spends money,
37
potentially improving government's accountability to the people,
8
countries.
and it has been a model of analysis for many other
The central lesson of tax expenditure analysis-that tax
provisions perform the same function as spending provisions and
should be analyzed in the same way-is a crucial lesson for legislators.
For example, tax expenditure analysis challenges us to analyze the
home mortgage deduction 9 as a government spending program that
subsidizes taxpayers' mortgage payments, the child tax credit 4° as a
direct government payment to families with children, and the earned
income tax credit 4' as a government-financed wage subsidy. Because
one of Congress' principal functions is appropriation of funds, the
economic equivalence that tax expenditure analysis highlights is
central to the legislature's performance of its task. The problems with
tax expenditure analysis and the difficulties of compiling the tax
expenditure budget do not significantly undermine their utility in the
legislative arena. The tax expenditure budget is generally and
broadly accurate as a list of tax provisions that function as
37. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2 & 31 U.S.C.), required that a list of tax expenditures
be included in the budget every year. The tax expenditure budget quantifies the cost of
tax expenditure provisions and details their allocations among the various government
agencies. It estimates the revenue losses associated with individual tax provisions, and
describes the provisions included in the budget. For example, the tax expenditure budget
has a category for "health" provisions, under which it quantifies the revenue loss on
account of the exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance premiums and
the deductibility of medical expenses, among others. See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 5, at 71-98. The OMB quantifies the cost in two ways, which produce different
totals for tax expenditures: the revenue cost method quantifies the amount of revenue that
would have been collected had tax been collected without the tax expenditures. The outlay
equivalent method quantifies the amount of revenue that would have been necessary if tax
had been collected and the government transferred sufficient funds to the taxpayer to
cover the tax liability. Where they differ, the outlay equivalent method generally results in
a higher amount. For a description of the economic assumptions used in determining the
numbers, see id. at 84-87. The Joint Committee only uses the revenue cost method. See
JOINT COMMITTEE BUDGET, supranote 11, para. 61.
38. See INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE

STUDY (Paul R. McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey eds., 1985).
39. I.R.C. § 163(h).
40. I.R.C. § 24.
41. I.R.C. § 32.
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government spending, even though it would be impossible to prove

that it is truly accurate in every detail.42 Its failure to achieve
complete accuracy is not critical to the legislators who can use it to
identify the type and magnitude of tax provisions that could be

reenacted as spending programs.43

For courts, however, the occasional haziness inherent in tax

expenditure analysis is much more problematic.

The equivocal

definition of income and the debatable question of whether particular
items should be included in the tax expenditure budget make tax
expenditure analysis an inadequate guide for deciding individual
lawsuits. The theory is also of limited use in drawing lines between

taxpayers, a task that courts engage in regularly, but that Congress
rarely performs. 44 The general accuracy that makes the concept and

the list helpful to legislators in determining broad questions of policy
would be small consolation to courts attempting to apply those
policies in specific cases. Additionally, in reviewing legislation, courts

do not get to pick and choose from among a variety of policy
alternatives; they cannot decide to modify the legislative program or
implement it in a different way. Rather, courts are called upon to
uphold or strike down the legislation involved in a particular case or

the government's application of it.45
Tax expenditure analysis calls on Congress to do the functional
equivalent of reappropriating tax expenditures by identifying those

sections of the Code that should be evaluated like spending

provisions. Provisions omitted from the list of tax expenditures are
properly analyzed as "tax" provisions, according to tax expenditure
analysis. Thus tax expenditures have become easier targets for
reform than structural provisions, 46 and lobbyists try to characterize
their cherished provisions as income-defining in order to keep them

42. Most people who care enough to consider the question would agree on most
provisions in the tax expenditure budget. The OMB and the Joint Committee only differ
on 17 provisions. See JOINT COMMITTEE BUDGET, supra note 11, para. 60.
43. Of course, legislators can misuse the tax expenditure budget, as well as the rhetoric
of tax expenditure analysis, for political reasons. See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying
text.
44. When Congress singles out a particular taxpayer, it often does so obscurely. The
most famous example is the "Louis B. Mayer" provision, which provided a special pension
benefit for him alone without mentioning him by name in the Code. See Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 §1240. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot TransitionRules and
Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constitutional?,44 TAX L. REV. 563 (1989).
45. Though courts have undertaken significant remedial measures in certain contexts,
they do not rewrite federal statutes and have limited discretion that might be informed by
tax expenditure analysis.
46. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: TAX EXPENDITURES
DESERVE MORE SCRUTINY (1994).
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off the tax-expenditure hit list.47 Making tax expenditures easier
targets for reform might be defensible from a legislative perspective
either because the structural provisions are contributing to some
ideal, such as a comprehensive income tax base, that Congress is
48
slowly striving towards by reviewing and repealing tax expenditures,
or because there are simply too many provisions for the legislature to
identify areas in which legislative attention is warranted, so that the
list of tax expenditures assists the legislature in focusing its attention
to where changes are warranted.
Unlike the legislature, the judiciary is never in the position of
having the entire Code before it, and never has the opportunity to
change any provision it dislikes. Courts are only called upon to
consider cases and controversies, and therefore, no second-order
screening device, such as the tax expenditure budget, is necessary to
guide the courts to provisions that they should review. Once a tax
provision is challenged, the courts can turn directly to the legal
standards to determine the nature of the scrutiny that is appropriate.
The ambiguities of tax expenditure analysis are not the only
reason why courts have wisely resisted embracing it.49 Their
hesitancy is justified because judicial adoption of tax expenditure
analysis could constitutionalize the definition of income and, as a byproduct, reduce judicial scrutiny of income-defining provisions. It
could also make constitutional consequences more vulnerable to
political maneuvering, and set Congress and the courts on conflicting
paths in shaping the tax law. The remainder of Part I explores these
problems.
B. Defining and Constitutionalizing "Income" While Reducing Scrutiny

for Structural Tax Provisions
One of the problems with tax expenditure analysis's insistence
that economically equivalent tax and spending programs be analyzed
consistently, even in constitutional cases, is that it gives the definition
of a tax expenditure constitutional importance. This section argues
that treating tax expenditures and direct expenditures identically
would impose an unreasonable burden on the definition of a tax
47. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GuCCi
GULCH 196-97 (1988). See also PAUL MCDANIEL, TAX AND SPEND 5 (Spring 1998)

(arguing against using the tax expenditure budget as a "hit list") (manuscript on file with

author).
48. While Professor Surrey clearly linked tax expenditures and tax reform, Professor
McDaniel has rejected that connection.
49. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm. of the City of
New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affid sub
nom Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). But see McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448
(D.D.C. 1972) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 176-80).
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expenditure.
Tax expenditure analysis presumes an ability to distinguish tax
expenditures and structural provisions; identification as a tax
expenditure is the first step in analyzing a tax provision according to
the criteria applied to spending programs. But distinguishing tax
expenditures from the structural components of the federal income
tax has always been a problem. At one time, scholars debated
whether such a distinction was even possible,50 and although no
consensus emerged from that controversy, commentators seem to
have lost interest in discussing the question of whether any tax
expenditure budget is defensible. Instead, discussion has turned to
the proper categorization of individual provisions,5' and it is not
unusual for current analyses of tax expenditures to ignore altogether
the theoretical impossibility of their identification. 52
While definitional uncertainty is manageable in the legislative
arena, such ambiguity is very troublesome if constitutional
implications flow from it. Incomplete resolution of the myriad
definitional problems that arise at the edges of the tax expenditure
concept could lead to undesirable results in difficult cases. If
categorization of a provision as a structural tax provision causes it to
be upheld by a court despite constitutional infirmities, then it
provides a windfall to those who benefit from it. The definitional
uncertainty of the tax may allow taxpayers to reap benefits that a
court would not allow if the provision were not categorized as
income-defining. On the other hand, if a tax provision is mistakenly
equated with a direct spending provision so that the tax provision is
invalidated, then certain programs that Congress has found desirable

50. See Bittker, Tax Subsidies, supra note 17; Surrey & Hellmuth, supra note 17. See
also Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (1980); Thuronyi, supranote 32.
51. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-TaxExpenditure or Proper
Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1979) (accelerated
depreciation); Renee Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of Its Citizens Abroad: Incentive
or Equity, 38 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1985) (special treatment of foreign earned income);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: QualifiedPlans, Tax Expenditures, and
the Flat, Plan Level Tax, 13 VA. TAX REV. 591 (1994) (pension taxation); Norman P.
Stein, Qualified Plansand Tax Expenditures:A Reply to ProfessorZelinsky, 9 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 225 (1991) (same); Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax
Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 257 (1991) (same);
Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax ExpenditureBudgets: A CriticalView, 54 TAX
NOTES 1661, 1663.4 (1992) (lower rates in a progressive system, and deductions for blind
and elderly).
52. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: TAX EXPENDITURES
DESERVE MORE SCRUTINY

ENTrILEMENTS (1996).

(1994); CrrIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, THE HIDDEN
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will be foreclosed as unconstitutional. 53 In a case involving
definitional uncertainty, the constitutional question turns on a
contested distinction between a structural provision and an
expenditure-a distinction that may be no less arbitrary than the one
between direct and indirect government expenditure.
Connected with the problem of satisfactorily distinguishing tax
expenditures from structural tax provisions is the tendency of tax
expenditure rhetoric, apart from its actual content, to emphasize the
undesirability of tax expenditure provisions 54 and consequently to
The
imply that structural tax provisions are permanent.
nomenclature choices are revealing: some provisions are "structural,"
implying that the tax system might collapse without them, even
though the decision about the particular structure is not a product of
tax expenditure analysis. Courts may be led to believe that striking
down a "structural" provision would be of greater consequence than
striking down an "expenditure" that has made its way by stealth or
accident into the Code.55 The special constitutional scrutiny that the
strong version of tax expenditure analysis would impose on tax
expenditures may yield a lack of scrutiny for tax provisions that make
up the normal structure of an income tax. Although courts could
subject items not on the tax expenditure list to the same treatment as
those on the list,56 items left off the list benefit from the presumption57
that they are pure tax provisions, or simply revenue raising devices.
53. Surrey and McDaniel have suggested that judges look to the tax expenditure
budget to determine whether an item should be evaluated as a spending program, rather
than evaluating themselves whether a tax provision functions like a spending program.
See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 13 at 119. While the
political concerns would be more substantial if judges adopt the tax expenditure budget
compiled by either the administration or the Joint Committee, definitional uncertainty and
mistakes can occur whether judges, politician, or bureaucrats make the determination.
54. Professor Surrey linked tax expenditures to tax reform: "[T]he task of tax reform
lay in a systematic exploration of the Tax Expenditure Budget." SURREY, PATHWAYS,
supra note 13, at viii. See also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures,
83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 734-35 (1970) (expressing doubt whether there are any advantages
to tax expenditures as compared with equivalent direct expenditures).
55. When Professor Surrey appeared before the Senate Finance Committee,
Chairman Harry Byrd accused him of insinuating that tax incentives were adopted without
the knowledge of many congressmen. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 47, at 14.
See also Griffith, supra note 16, at 359 (arguing that the 1986 Act proves that Congress
chooses the distribution of the tax burden using a combination of tax preferences and
rates).
56. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 13 at 144 (arguing
that it would be impossible to claim that items on the list should not be analyzed like
direct spending since Congress put them on the list, but that items not on the list could be
treated like those on the list by courts considering such provisions).
57. It has been noted that even pure revenue raising provisions promote certain
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Thus, wholesale adoption of tax expenditure analysis into judicial
decisionmaking threatens to constitutionalize the definition of income
by making income-defining provisions less vulnerable to
constitutional attack than tax expenditures.
For example, Congress might adopt a provision that allows
taxpayers to deduct the costs of private school tuition 58 on the ground
that parents of private school students are double-taxed when taxed
for the support of public schools and then required to use after-tax
dollars to pay for private school. 59 The double-tax explanation
provides a structural justification for the deduction that depends on
arguments about how to measure income. 60 Alternatively, Congress
might adopt the deduction because private schools reduce the
burdens on government by alleviating the government's need to
Individuals who reduce the
provide educational services. 61
government's burden while increasing their own financial obligations
have reduced their own ability to pay taxes at the same time that they
benefit the fisc. 62 Ability-to-pay arguments explain the deduction's
role as part of the structure of an income tax;63 income is measured
behaviors and reflect particular values. See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate
Structure:Identifying and Addressing the GenderedNature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL.
241,246-47 (1997).
58. Congress recently considered a provision that approximates such a deduction. See
H.R. 2646, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998) (allowing parents to use untaxed build-up in investment
accounts to pay for private school tuition).
59. This theory was suggested by the Supreme Court in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
396 (1983): "[Ihe Minnesota Legislature's judgment that a deduction for educational
expenses fairly equalizes the tax burden of its citizens ... is entitled to substantial
deference." The Court considered the deduction for educational expenses a "genuine tax
deduction." Id. at 397 n.6 (distinguishing Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973)).
60. An income tax must measure income accurately in order to tax every dollar once
and only once.
61. Mueller v. Allen suggests this explanation as well. 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
62. Cf. DAvID F. BRADFORD ET AL., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 83-84
(2d ed. 1984) (including a deduction for state and local income taxes in the Model Tax
Based on Income because these payments reduce the resources available to the payor for
consumption or accumulation).
63. This type of approach has been explored by Professor Victor Thuronyi. See
Thuronyi, supra note 32. He suggests that we replace the tax expenditure concept with the
concept of "substitutable" tax provisions. A substitutable provision is any "tax law
provision whose purposes a non-tax-based federal program can achieve at least as
effectively." Id. at 1156. If the purpose of the provision is to relieve the tax burden on
income, then the provision is not substitutable. See id. at 1186-88. In evaluating the
constitutionality of tax provisions, Thuronyi considers whether a provision is a true taxing
provision, i.e., one relating to tax burden allocation. He compares Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983), in which the Supreme Court upheld a tax deduction for school tuition
and supplies available to all taxpayers, with Committeefor Public Educationand Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), in which the Court struck down a tax credit for
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inaccurately when an item is double-taxed.
Another example of too little scrutiny for normative elements of
the tax might be the exemption from tax for certain types of
organizations. 64 The tax exemption for religious, educational and
charitable organizations 65 is not listed as a tax expenditure. 66 There
are various justifications for why the exemption is not a tax
expenditure.
Some commentators have argued that the
organization's income is not income at all in the accretion sense, but
rather the pooling of the separate income of individuals, 67 and that
nonprofit organizations do not benefit individual
taxpayers and are
68
therefore inappropriate objects of taxation.
But why should the structural arguments matter if the schools or
organizations discriminate on the basis of race? In that case, courts
should investigate whether the deduction or exemption amounts to
government discrimination.
This approach would certainly be
preferable to a policy of overlooking constitutional claims because
the challenged code sections are "structural." Whether the state

private school tuition. Thuronyi rationalizes the Supreme Court's holdings in those cases
on the grounds that "the Minnesota deduction [upheld in Mueller] was motivated at least
in part by tax-policy considerations unrelated to the goal of providing aid to private
schools." Id. at 1204. Because nobody made an ability-to-pay type argument in Nyquist,
which appears to be the sine qua non of a tax policy justification, Thuronyi concludes that
it was reasonable for the Court to strike down the tax credits in that case for providing aid
to sectarian schools. Thus, Thuronyi bases his distinction between Mueller and Nyquist on
the essential tax nature of the provision in Mueller and the absence of that nature in
Nyquist. See iL at 1204-05.
While Thuronyi tries to erase the unworkable distinction that tax expenditure analysis
creates by separating taxing provisions from spending provisions, he introduces an
analogous distinction between substitutable and non-substitutable provisions, inviting
increased scrutiny only for substitutable provisions. Thus, Thuronyi's categorization gives
non-substitutable provisions a special status equivalent to Surrey's structural tax
provisions, making his proposal quite similar to the tax expenditure analysis in this
respect. While Thuronyi rejects the normal income tax, his proposal is dependent upon
"tax structure issues," as is tax expenditure analysis. Just like that analysis, his proposal
seems to rely upon identifying whether a provision really is a "tax" provision or not, but
without defining the theoretical parameters for what counts as a tax. In elevating tax
structure without presenting a normative tax, Thuronyi's tax structure is empty. Thus,
Thuronyi's alternative to tax expenditure analysis shares tax expenditure analysis' flaw in
overprotecting the structure of the tax, but without the benefits of the comprehensive base
that provides the normative underpinning for tax expenditure analysis.
64. For greater discussion of exempt organizations and the charitable contribution
deduction, see infrapart II.
65. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
66. See ANALYTICAL PERSPECIVES, supra note 5, at 73-75.
67. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
from FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299,307-09 (1976).
68. See Bittker, Tax Subsidies, supra note 17, at 256; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 67,
at 314-316.
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discriminates on the basis of race cannot possibly depend on the
definition of income.
It is easy to make arguments for why a provision is part of the
structure of an income tax, and it is easy to see that even normative
provisions defended on income-definition grounds might in fact
promote certain kinds of schools or particular classes of taxpayers.
This definitional slipperiness underscores the problem with applying
exacting constitutional scrutiny only to tax expenditures and never to
structural provisions. Characterizing a provision as a structural
component of the tax could protect its possibly unconstitutional
effects.
The problems of a two-tier system of judicial review can be
illustrated by a recent real-life example. During the debates over the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,69 Representative Archer, chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee, 70 opposed the
Administration's efforts to make the child tax credit 7' refundable and
stated that he would consider refundability of the credit to be a
welfare (i.e. spending) provision, rather than a tax provision. 72 In the
legislation that was eventually adopted, the child credit is refundable,
but only to the extent that the taxpayer has paid FICA 73 that is not
refunded through the earned income credit. 74 If Chairman Archer's
view of the refundability provision-as a welfare program- were to
prevail, then the refundability feature would be part of the tax
expenditure budget,75 and thereby treated somewhat like a spending
provision.76 On the other hand, if the entire provision were included
69.
70.
71.
72.

Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
The Ways and Means Committee is responsible for tax legislation in the House.
I.R.C. § 24.
See Richard W. Stevenson, Main G.O.P. Tax Writer Balks At a Credit That Clinton

Wants, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,1997, at A18.
73. FICA is the combined Social Security and Medicare tax paid on a wage base, not

according to income. See I.R.C. §§ 3101,3111.
74. I.R.C. § 32.
75. Some would argue that the child credit should be included in the tax expenditure
budget, regardless of the refundability provision, but others would argue that the child
credit is a normative tax provision because it adjusts for the taxpaying ability of families
depending on their size. See infra note 77. Neither OMB nor the Joint Committee
analyzes the different components of the child credit in their explanations. See
ANALYTICAL PERsPEcrIvEs, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FIscAL
YEAR 1999, at 92 [hereinafter 1999 ANALYTICAL PERSPECrivEs]; JOINT COMMITrEE
BUDGET, supra note 11, para. 32. However, OMB includes payments made in excess of
the tax liability (i.e. the refundable portion) in the direct spending budget for both the
earned income tax credit and the child credit. See 1999 ANALYTICAL PERSPEcrIVES,
supra, at 515-16. Thus, the amounts included in the tax expenditure budget are apparently
limited to the nonrefundable portion.
76. It is not clear how Representative Archer would characterize the part of the credit
that offsets tax liability but is not refundable.
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as a normative tax provision because it helps measure the ability of
families of different sizes to pay tax,77 or achieves progressivity in
rates, it would not be treated as a spending provision but would be
part of the structure of the tax. This structure-fulfilling function
would identify the provision as one necessary to define income.
For purposes of analysis, let us assume that nonrefundability
would allocate greater benefits to white families, while refundability
would allocate greater benefits to minority families. What if
Congress chose to design the refundability provision in order to
78
provide tax benefits primarily to families of a particular race?
Whether this provision should be subject to an equal protection
challenge should have nothing to do with the provision's
categorization as a tax expenditure or structural provision. If
Congress designs a provision for the express purpose of providing an
economic benefit to white families and denying the same benefit to
minority families, then it should be subject to an equal protection
challenge. A provision's distributional consequences and the intent
behind them are not determined by its characterization as a tax
expenditure.
C. Politicization of Tax Expenditure Concept

Another reason why wholesale judicial adoption of tax
expenditure analysis is undesirable is that the constitutional
consequences that flow from defining the normal tax would be
vulnerable to political manipulation. The tax expenditure budget can
be a forceful political weapon because items included in that budget
are quantified federal spending, while excluded items are largely
invisible. Surrey dramatized this point by explaining that the home
mortgage deduction means that the federal government sends richer
taxpayers large checks to subsidize their mortgages, middle-income
taxpayers medium checks, and refuses to subsidize the poorest
77. Along the lines of the dependency exemption. See I.R.C. § 151(c). The
definitional question for the child credit is similar to the definitional question for the
dependency deduction. For a discussion that treats the dependency deduction as a tax
expenditure, see Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349
(1994) (discussing welfarist and externalities arguments). See also HENRY C. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 140 (1938) (arguing that child support is voluntary
consumption). For a defense of the dependency exemption as a structural provision
because child support is involuntary consumption, see Boris I. Bittker, FederalIncome
Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1444-56 (1975).
78. I propose this hypothetical because it presents an egregious example of legislative
intent to discriminate on the basis of race, which suggests serious equal protection
problems under a standard of strict scrutiny. See infra, Part II. It is necessary to use
hypothetical provisions in this discussion because there is no income-defining provision of
current law that would meet the high standard of intent necessary for a violation of the
equal protection clause.
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mortgagors at all. 79
The inherent flexibility in the tax expenditure definition was

manipulated by the Reagan Treasury to change the baseline tax
80
against which tax expenditures

are identified and measured.

Whereas Surrey used a modified version of an economic ideal, the
Reagan Treasury dispensed with the normative foundation and81
adopted a reference tax law baseline that resembled existing law.
Consequently, departures from the base were defined so that the tax

expenditure budget became increasingly skewed in favor of social
spending, and business incentives were etched into the tax's normal
structure. 82

The Reagan Treasury's redefinition

of the tax

expenditure reflects not only the continuing problem of defining the
normal tax, which I have already argued should give one pause before

attaching legal consequences to that definition, 83 but also the ability

of those in control of the official definition to alter it to serve political
goals. If courts place too much importance on the list, then those who
assemble the list-tax specialists in the Treasury and Joint Committee

who are not accountable in the political process and who necessarily
bring their own views to the task of categorization84-have very

significant power.85
The rhetoric of tax expenditure analysis transforms "tax cuts"
into "spending programs" (and vice versa), with the political
consequences that follow from those characterizations. The politician

who cuts taxes in the 1990s is favored over the one who increases
spending. The debate over refundability of the child credit 86 is an

79. See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 13, at 234-35.
80. See SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 1983, at 10-11. See also SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1986, at G-1 to G-11 (comparing old and new

analytical methods).
81. See 1999 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 75, at 104.

82. The Reagan Treasury included the reduced rate for capital gains and accelerated
depreciation as part of the normal tax. See ANALYTICAL PERPSECTIVES, supra note 5.
Even Surrey's model can be considered biased towards business in its departures from the
Haig-Simons income definition. If Haig-Simons were used as the normal tax, then
unrealized appreciation would significantly change the distribution of tax expenditures.
83. See supra Part I.B.
84. Professor Surrey had great confidence in the tax experts who would prepare the
tax expenditure budget. See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 13, at 19-21. Professor
Surrey may have been too trusting.
85. The text assumes that the courts would accept the categorization of tax
expenditures that has been prepared by OMB or the Joint Committee. However, it would
be possible for the courts themselves to undertake an initial determination of whether a
provision should be categorized as a tax expenditure. This approach would reduce the
problems of politicization of the constitutional determination, but would not address the
other problems described in the text.
86. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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example of the use of tax expenditure rhetoric in this politicized
When Chairman Archer argued that he considers
manner.
refundability of the credit to constitute a welfare program, rather
than a tax program,87 he managed to harness public hostility to
welfare and disassociate the provision from the popular support that
tax cuts enjoy.
The political right has been quite successful in using the tax
expenditure budget to attack programs it dislikes. 88 Opponents of
government spending have succeeded in targeting tax expenditures
for elimination, without proposing that they be replaced with direct
spending programs. The tax expenditure budget has become a target
for proponents of smaller government, a knee-jerk hit list,8 9 with
"reformers" ignoring the implication inherent in tax expenditure
analysis that tax expenditures should be evaluated as direct spending
programs to determine if they should be administered through the tax
law. One commentator has claimed that tax expenditure analysis has
proved to be unsuccessful precisely because it has made provisions
listed in the tax expenditure budget easy targets for repeal without
increasing actual scrutiny of the policies represented by those
provisions, and without fostering analysis of the best way to achieve
governmental objectives. 90
Adopting the tax expenditure concept into judicial
decisionmaking threatens to compound the malleability of the normal
tax structure and its susceptibility to politicization. If a provision's
inclusion in the tax expenditure budget carries implications for how a
court must analyze it when faced with constitutional questions, then
whoever compiles the list has the power to affect the extent of the
courts' examination of Code provisions. 91
An additional drawback to the constitutionalization of tax
expenditure analysis could be the increased isolation of tax policy that
it could engender. If the courts constitutionalize distinctions that are
the product of the internal structure and coherence of the tax law,
then the tax law will become more self-contained and independent of
non-tax government policies. Tax expenditure analysis would reduce
the number of provisions that should be analyzed as "tax policy" by
identifying only certain Code sections as part of the "tax" law. It
87. See Stevenson, supra note 72.
88. Left-leaning organizations have also assailed many of the items listed in the tax
expenditure budget, but their denunciation of "corporate welfare" has not enjoyed the
political momentum of the right's attack on social welfare. See CITIZENS FOR TAX
JUSTICE, supra note 52.
89. See MCDANIEL, supra note 47 (manuscript at p. 5).
90. Thuronyi, supra note 32, at 1181.
91. This problem does not exist if the courts engage in tax expenditure analysis
without adopting any official version of the tax expenditure budget.
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would consequently perpetuate the separation of what remains within
tax policy apart from broader government policies. Only by
increasing scrutiny of tax provisions generally, and making them
subject to review for consistency with policies reflected outside the
Code, can tax policy become more sensitive to the broader social
policies that it increasingly reflects. Without constitutionalizing the
structural components of the income tax, every tax provision can be
reviewed on its own merits. Because tax expenditure analysis, on
balance, may do more to isolate tax policy from social policy than to
integrate it, it is crucial that its application be confined to the
legislature, where it is most constructive.
D. Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax

There is a final reason why tax expenditure analysis should not
constitutionalize the structure of the income tax: the increasingly
hybrid nature of the federal income tax, as more consumption tax
elements are 93incorporated. 92 A hybrid base defies the ideal of a
"normal" tax. While the normal tax does not have to be an income
tax, there can be no tax expenditures where the underlying tax is
simply a hodgepodge of excises that are not based on any structural
tax components. 94 A complete embrace of the hybrid tax model fully
rejects tax expenditure analysis. But even a tentative acceptance of
the hybrid tax raises doubts regarding constitutionalization of tax
expenditure analysis.
When Surrey advocated for adoption of the tax expenditure
budget, he stopped short of arguing in favor of income as the basic
structure, 95 and instead accepted that the United States had chosen
income as the tax base. 96 By reason of that choice, Surrey concluded
that the list of tax expenditures should consist of those provisions that
are not necessary to the accurate measurement of income. The list of
92. For example, the treatment of employer-provided pension plans, individual
retirement accounts, and qualified state tuition programs all effectively exempt investment
yield from tax.
93. A tax expenditure is simply the absence of a tax that we would otherwise expect to
find according to a particular theory of taxation. This standard against which expenditures
are measured is sometimes called a "normal" or "normative" tax. See ANALYTICAL
PERSPECrIVES, supra note 5, at 71 (using the "normal" tax method); JOINT COMMrITEE

BUDGET, supra note 11, at para. 8 ("tax expenditures are to be defined with reference to a
normal tax structure"). See also SURREY, PATHWAYS supra note 13, at 7 (discussing a
"normative" model of an income tax).
94. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAx EXPENDITURES, supranote 13, at 233.
95. He has been criticized for failing to defend the income base. See, e.g., Griffith,
supranote 16, at 364.
96. See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 13, at 15-21; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 13, at 5. Professor McDaniel continues to hold this view. See
MCDANIEL, supranote 47, at 7.
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tax expenditures that he proffered, as well as the lists compiled by the
Joint Committee on Taxation and the Office of Management and
Budget today, was composed of items that escape tax despite their
characterization as income under a distant cousin of the Haig-Simons
definition of income. 97
It may have been reasonable for Surrey to have assumed the
income base when he first developed the tax expenditure budget,
since he wrote against the backdrop of considerable scholarly and
governmental excitement about a comprehensive income tax base. 98
Congressional interest in a comprehensive income tax seems to have
peaked around the time that Tax Expenditures was published in 1985,
culminating in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 99
But the post-1986 mood seems to have changed, and this decade
has seen a clear legislative and popular move away from a
comprehensive income tax. 100 Professor Shaviro has described the
cyclical nature of tax legislation-a move toward purification of the
tax base (tax reform) followed by a move away from such reform and
toward the use of the tax law as a social tool. 10 ' Consistent with that
change in ideal, tax legislation in the 1990s has increased the Code's
97. Strict adherence to the Haig-Simons definition of income would require taxation
of imputed income, for example, which was not part of Surrey's normal tax base. See
SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 13, at 12-13. Professor McDaniel's Tax and Spend
seems to have moved closer to a Haig-Simons ideal than did his previous work with
Professor Surrey. Compare MCDANIEL, supra note 47, at 6-1 ("My own view is that if an
item is excluded from the tax base but would fall within the S-H-S definition of income,
there is a rather strong presumption created that the item is a tax expenditure.") with
SURREY & McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 13, at 4 (accepting the exclusion
of unrealized appreciation and imputed income from the normative tax).
98. See Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax
Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 925 (1967) ("It is no exaggeration to say that a
'comprehensive tax base'... has come to be the major organizing concept in most serious
discussions of our federal income tax structure."). See also COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
TAXATION (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977); BRADFORD, supra note 62; DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
ch. 1 (1984) [hereinafter TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICrrY AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH].

99. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, §§ 142 (limit on deductibility of
business meals), 501 (passive loss rules), 6011 (repeal of capital gains preference),
134(a)(1) (repealing deduction for sales tax), 100 Stat. 2085.
100. See S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995) (Nunn-Domenici bill); H.R. 4585, 104th, Cong.
(1996) (Axmey Flat Tax bill); 142 Cong. Rec. H3399-06, p. 72, April 16, 1996 (statement of
Rep. Archer, "We must tear the (income tax) out by the roots"); Elizabeth Kolbert,
Forbes' Silver Bullet for the Nation's Malaise, N.Y. TIMES, January 1, 1996, at Al (Steve
Forbes' Flat Tax Plan). See also ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX

(2d ed. 1995).
101. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1990).
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departures from a comprehensive tax on income. 1°2

Recent

amendments to the Code move the federal income tax one step

further from an ideal income tax and one step closer to a
consumption tax. 103 Many scholars have recognized, and accepted,
the "hybrid" nature of our income-consumption tax.1°4
Notwithstanding changes in the underlying definition of the tax

base and a greater acceptance of the consumption-tax model, the tax
expenditure budget continues to identify departures from an income
ideal. A glance at the tax expenditure budget reveals that many of
the provisions included therein would be structural in a tax based on
consumption. 05 Acceptance of the hybrid income-consumption tax
as an independent and legitimate policy choice undermines the
normative foundation on which the tax expenditure budget rests. In

other words, the hybrid income-consumption tax that we have-and
that we seem satisfied to develop further-threatens the very
existence of the tax expenditure. 1°6

If recent legislation is any indication, it is likely that Congress
will continue to adopt consumption-type provisions to further
economic and social goals. If so, judicial adoption of tax expenditure
analysis (and implicitly its income-based model) could set the two
branches of government working at cross-purposes. If the courts
analyze consumption-based provisions as exceptions from an income
tax, they will subject those provisions to restrictions based on an

102. Professor McDaniel interprets this history as a desire for greater use of tax
expenditures, without signaling any change in policy ideal concerning the basic structure
of the tax. The continued official preparation of the tax expenditure budget certainly
supports this perspective.
103. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 is replete with provisions that reduce the
effective rate of tax on accumulated income. See, e.g., Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-34, §§ 302 (Roth IRAs), 311 (capital gains), 312 (gain on sale of principal
residence), 111 Stat. 788.
104. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 609-10, 660 (1996); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a
Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L REV. 1145 (1992); UNEASY COMPROMISE
(Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988). See also MICHAEL J. GRAETz, THE DECLINE (AND
FALL ?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997) (calling for a more comprehensive income tax, with a
large exemption so that it taxes fewer people than the current tax, in addition to a national
consumption tax).
105. For example, the exclusion of contributions to and earnings in pension plans, the
exclusion for interest on state and local bonds, the expensing of business costs, accelerated
depreciation, and the deferral of gains for certain transactions.
106. The tax expenditure concept could be modified to accommodate the hybrid tax.
For example, the tax expenditure list could exclude all items that would be normal in
either a pure income tax or a pure consumption tax. But recognizing the compromise in
the tax base weakens the structure of the normal tax, perhaps to the point at which
departures from it have no normative significance.
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income model that Congress has chosen to reject.107 Congress' taxing
power would thus be compromised, creating unnecessary inter-branch
conflict and thwarting Congress's efforts to achieve legitimate
legislative goals.
H. Tax Expenditure Analysis in Constitutional Decisionmaking
In the last Part, I explained why wholesale importation of the
strong version of tax expenditure analysis into judicial
decisionmaking is undesirable. In this Part, I explain my more
qualified version by describing the approach that courts should follow
inconsidering the constitutionality of tax benefits and the significance
they should attach to the economic equivalence of tax benefits and
direct spending. This part begins with a brief discussion of state
action, a predicate for constitutional review by courts, and explains
why tax benefits should always be subject to constitutional scrutiny as
state action. Then it discusses how to evaluate government intent in
tax policy because government intent is a crucial element of the
substantive constitutional analysis that I argue must be applied to tax
provisions. After setting up a general approach, I separately explore
the constitutionality of tax benefits that flow to private organizations
under the equal protection and establishment clauses, applying the
doctrine developed in each of those areas and discussing the recent
Supreme Court cases that raise these issues. Because the Supreme
Court's current equal protection and establishment clause
jurisprudence does not lead to the conclusion that economic
equivalence is crucial for those constitutional provisions, I conclude
that tax provisions and direct spending programs having the same
economic effect could have different constitutional statuses. I also
consider alternative interpretations of the equal protection clause to
illustrate how the analysis of tax-based aid would differ pursuant to
those interpretations, and how economic equivalence could be central
to constitutional analysis.
A. State Action

One might argue that tax benefits do not involve sufficient state
action to trigger constitutional scrutiny. 108 After all, it is the taxpayer
107. It would be possible to limit the tax expenditure budget to any provision that fit
neither an income nor a consumption base, and treat the federal tax like a combination of
two comprehensive tax bases. However, that would be inconsistent with reality as well
because the tax that Congress has chosen picks provisions from both ideal bases, but
refuses to adopt either one purely and totally. For an explanation of why we have the
hybrid we have, see Kornhauser, supranote 104.
108. It is well settled that the Constitution only prohibits discrimination by the
government, not by private parties. The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State
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who decides to take advantage of the charitable deduction by writing
a check to a religious institution or single-sex school. It is the
taxpayer, not the state, that makes the funding decision, and it is the
institution that carries out its own private policies.

The lack of government control inherent in the provision of tax
benefits supports the argument that such benefits cannot constitute

state action. The level of government involvement necessary to make
a private party into a state actor is substantial. 109 Unlike direct
government funding and operation, tax benefits are generally

characterized by a minimal level of government control" 0 and a
significant level of taxpayer cost."' The Supreme Court has been
reticent to find that state action exists where the wrong was under the

control of a private party--even where that party had significant
involvement with the state." 2 Because tax benefits generally create
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Through the Fifth Amendment, the strictures of the Fourteenth
Amendment also apply to the actions of the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954). It has been argued that at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, the common law was assumed to protect people from private discrimination, and
therefore, the Constitutional provision was necessary to stop government action,
completing the individual's right not to be discriminated against. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REv. 503 (1985) [hereinafter, Chemerinsky,
Rethinking].
109. The Supreme Court has found state action to exist in the actions of private parties
where those private parties exercise governmental power by executing a traditional public
function. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953) (state
action found where private party managed elections for public office); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (state action found where company operated a "company town").
110. This follows from the entitlement nature of tax benefits. See JOINT COMMITTEE
BUDGET, supra note 11, para. 6 ("Tax expenditures are most similar to those direct
spending programs that have no spending limits, and that are available as entitlements to
those who meet the statutory criteria established for the programs.") Once the Code
includes a provision, any taxpayer can arrange her affairs so as to benefit from it.
Occasionally, the government's revenue estimates will miscalculate the number of
taxpayers who will avail themselves of a benefit. For example, when Congress adopted
the deduction for IRA contributions, taxpayers saved themselves $32 billion over three
years, even though the government had predicted that the provision would only cost $5.5
billion. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 47, at 86.
111. Taxpayer cost is reflected in the non-subsidized portion of an expenditure that
receives preferential tax treatment. For example, a taxpayer in a 30% bracket is entitled
to a deduction for contributions that she makes to charity, but the government only
subsidizes her contributions to the extent of her tax rate, so that the taxpayer must fund
the other 70% of the gifts herself.
112. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. Unites States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (holding that the Committee was not bound by the Constitution,
even though it had been chartered by federal law and received federal funds); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-12 (1982) (finding that physicians who made decisions to
move patients out of nursing homes, thereby denying them Medicaid benefits, were not
state actors); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982) (refusing to apply First
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entitlements, taxpayers control their own receipt of them.
Entitlements do not preclude anyone who can satisfy their terms.
Therefore, tax-based support is not well-suited to singling out
particular individuals or organizations." 3 The cases suggest that the
government's considerable involvement with the private actor, even
not necessarily
where there is a significant financial subsidy,114 1does
5
turn that actor's decision into action of the state.
Amendment limitations to school's decision to fire teacher for her views on school policy,
even though school was funded and heavily regulated by the state); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1979) (holding that no state action existed where a statute
authorized self-help by parties seeking to repossess property).
113. But see supra note 44.
114. Even if a government subsidy may sometimes be a significant factor in finding
state action, tax-based support is always limited as a percentage of a private actor's
budget; tax benefits cannot constitute substantially all of a private organization's support.
The nature of tax benefits provided in the form of either an exemption, an exclusion, or a
deduction is such that the level of government support is limited to the tax rate that the
private actor would otherwise have paid. Unlike direct governmental spending programs,
the provision of tax benefits can never provide the majority of any private party's support.
For example, if an organization is funded entirely by private contributions from
individuals who are allowed deductions for their contributions, then the government may
be considered to subsidize those contributions at the value of the tax deductions-let us
assume 40%, which is approximately the highest individual rate under current law. This
means that 60% of the funding provided comes out of the pockets of the contributors,
limiting the government's share of funding to 40%. The 40% rate for contributors
provides a ceiling on the government's funding through this mechanism. If, in addition to
private contributions, the organization earns income on its investments, the government's
total support may increase, but its share of support will never go above 40% because the
exemption for the organization's earned income can be no greater than the highest
corporate tax rate, or 35%. Thus, if an organization receives $100 from contributors in the
highest bracket and earns $100, which would be taxed at the highest corporate rate if not
for an exemption (this assumption is generous to the government's share), then the
government's subsidy can be assumed to be $70, out of a total budget of $200. This
calculation assumes that contributions would not be included as part of a nonprofit's
taxable income, if the organization were subject to tax, and is consistent with current law
treatment for capital contributions to corporations. See I.R.C. § 118(a).
115. The only support for the argument that tax benefits imply state action by private
persons who discriminate is Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
In that case, the Supreme Court held that there was state action in a restaurant's decision
to exclude blacks because the restaurant was a tenant of the city-owned parking garage,
even though the city had no control over the operations of the restaurant. This lessorlessee relationship was a sufficient nexus between the state and the restaurant for the
Court to hold the state responsible for the restaurant's activities. On this reasoning, tax
benefits might constitute enough support or nexus necessary for state action. However,
Burton has never been extended to apply to tax benefits, and although it has not been
overruled, its continuing validity, even on its own terms, is questionable. See LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-3, at 1701 n.13 (2d ed. 1988),
[hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] at 1701 n.13; Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d
312 (6th Cir. 1988). But see Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995)
(Scalia, J., citing Burton in support of decision).

March 19991

TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS

Notwithstanding these arguments, tax benefits clearly implicate
both private action and government action. The issue, therefore, is
the constitutional status of this joint public and private
The
decisionmaking regarding the allocation of tax benefits.
requirement of both taxpayer and government action should not
operate to privatize the government's role. Neither must it subject
the private actor to constitutional scrutiny. It is not necessary to
attribute the private action to the state to find that state action exists.
Rather, the government's role in providingtax benefits should always
be evaluated as state action, even though the ultimate beneficiaries of
those benefits may be private actors beyond the reach of the
Constitution's constraints. Where the government action is in passing
legislation, the legislation must be subject to review; where the action
is in regulation or administrative practice, those must comply with
constitutional standards as well. 116 Thus, when considering tax
benefits, courts should approach the state action issue by separating
the question of whether the government should be prohibited from
providing a tax benefit from the question of whether a private party
should be prohibited from engaging in an activity facilitated by those
benefits." 7
Professor Tribe has explained the Court's state action doctrine
by focusing on state acts separately from state actors."8 He explains
the cases in which challenges to private actions are allowed by
describing them as challenges to state acts-a government's
delegation of authority to churches, 119 a state's common law of libel
that raises First Amendment concerns, 20 a state's rule of tort
immunity. 121 Based on these cases, Professor Tribe argues that there
can be state action even where the private parties are not deemed to
be state actors-the state action may be in the state's law that allows
one private person to sue another, the state's granting of governmentlike authority to a private party, the state's placing of monopoly
power in a private party, and the state's immunization of private
116. The argument that tax benefits fail, by their nature, to constitute state action,
hangs on the fact that those benefits, standing alone, will never transform a private actor
into a state actor. If the state action question always requires the private actor to be an
agent of the government, it creates an unnecessarily high threshold for state action, and
allows more private discrimination than is necessary to ensure that the private realm is not
obliterated. Cf. Henry J. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private
Penumbra,TEx. Q. Summer 1969, supp., at 1.
117. See Robert Clarke Brown, State Action Analysis of Tax Expenditures, 11 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 97,112 (1976).
118. See LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHoicEs 246-266 (1985) [hereinafter,
TRIBE, CHOICESI.
119. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
120. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
121. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
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people from consequences of their actions.122
Professor Tribe's perspective helps to illuminate the state action
issue for tax benefits by focusing on the legal regime. The creation of
the legal regime itself-the statutes, regulations, and administrative
practice that authorize taxpayers to direct public funds as they wishis undeniably state action.
Whether that action violates the
substantive protections of the Constitution is a separate question.
But it is not necessary to find that any private party is a state actor in
order to attack the state itself for providing that party with benefits. 123
B. Evaluating Government Intent in Tax Policy
Identifying the creation of the tax benefit as state action does not
resolve the more difficult question of government intent. When the
funding of a religious or discriminatory institution requires a
combination of government and private action, how should courts
evaluate the intent underlying that action? This section offers a
framework for such analysis.
If the government intends to discriminate on the basis of race or
gender, then its decision is subject to heightened scrutiny under the
equal protection clause. If its purpose is to favor religion, then its
actions violate the establishment clause.
Given that these
constitutional provisions place great importance on government
intent or purpose, how does the nature of government intent reflected
in tax provisions compare to the nature of government intent
apparent in direct spending provisions?
Taxpayer choice-the
taxpayer's power to determine how government funds are allocatedis a hallmark of tax benefits. 124 This is because the taxpayer can
122. See TRIBE, CHOICES, supranote 118, at 264-65.
123. It is possible to prohibit the government from providing tax benefits without
prohibiting private action by allowing a constitutional challenge to proceed against the
government, but precluding an action for injunctive relief against the private party. See
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp 1150 (D.D.C. 1971); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp.
448 (D.D.C. 1972). Professor Tribe has suggested that the plaintiffs in Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974) should have sued the government authority granting benefits rather than the
private party engaged in the discriminatory behavior. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 115, at 1717-18. To the extent that the state action requirement prevents
intrusive remedies that disrupt private operations, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 390 (1997) [hereinafter
CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES],

these concerns are absent in a suit of this type against the

government, which would simply require a revocation of tax benefits. As long as the
government's participation is severable from the private action, as it always is in the case
of tax benefits, the state action doctrine should never operate to preclude review of the
government's action in supporting the private party.
124. If individual choice is of constitutional importance with respect to tax-based
programs, then it should be significant for non-tax based programs as well. Professors
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choose to avail herself of a generally available provision by fitting

within its contours.

For example, taxpayers can require the

government to contribute to the cost of their education by claiming

an allowable credit or deduction for that education. They can require
the government to help support their favorite charities by making
deductible contributions to those charities. 125 Regardless of whether

individual choice is socially desirable,126 it is constitutionally
significant because it can separate the government's intent from the

ultimate recipient of tax benefits.
State support of private institutions falls along a spectrum of
government involvement. At one end is VMI, operated and
supported by the state. In that case, it was clear to the Supreme Court
that the state was responsible for the sex-based discrimination of the
institution. The other end of the spectrum is represented by the
Surrey and McDaniel have long pointed out that direct spending programs could give
discretion to individuals in allocating government funds. See Paul R. McDaniel, Federal
Matching Grantsfor CharitableContributions:A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction,

27 TAX L. REV. 377 (1972) (dispensing with the charitable deduction, but retaining
individual choice precisely as it operates under the deduction); SURREY & MCDANIEL,
TAX EXPENDrrURES, supra note 13, at 100. Individual choice is only a factor affecting the
treatment of tax-based programs because it currently happens to be a hallmark of such
programs, not because it must be a characteristic nor because only tax-based programs can
allow for individual choice. Nevertheless, as long as tax-based programs have different
characteristics than direct spending programs, it is worth considering the implications of
those differences, even if those differences do not have to exist.
125. As with many tax provisions, the government's contribution in these cases depends
on the taxpayer having sufficient tax liability to absorb the government benefit. In the
case of the charitable contribution deduction, the taxpayer must also be an itemizer. See
I.R.C. § 62 (stating that the charitable deduction is not allowed in determining adjusted
gross income).
126. Before considering whether individual choice should have any constitutional
significance, it is worth asking whether individual choice is desirable-whether individuals,
rather than government and its processes, should be empowered to determine how
government funds are spent. In the context of charitable giving, individual choice has
been championed on pluralist grounds: government should not have the power to choose
what is valuable in art or culture and that individual choice insures toleration for fringe
groups and support for developing ideas. See, e.g. Donald L. Sharpe, Unfair Business
Competition and the Tax on Income Destinedfor Charity: Forty-Six Years Later, 3 FLA.
TAX REV. 367, 378-79 (1996). But see, Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable

Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1410 (1988) (stating that managers of
artistic enterprises claim that private support requires them to cater to conventional
tastes). However, individual choice raises questions for representative democracy. In an
age of dwindling discretionary spending, whose discretion is best? Some might argue that
democratically elected representatives are a better choice for determining how
government money is spent than are the wealthy donors to charitable organizations. I
have argued elsewhere that corporate managers are an undesirable choice in determining
where corporate philanthropy goes because they represent a concentration of power

outside the democratic process. See Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporationand the Tax
Treatment of CorporatePhilanthropy,41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 853 (1997).
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example of police and fire protection-general services provided by
the state to everyone.'1 7 By providing the same benefits to everyone,
the government support is tangential to the sphere of private activity
and the state does not discriminate on any basis. The greater the
government involvement in a particular activity, the easier it is to
equate institutional purpose with governmental purpose.
Government support through tax benefits, in particular the
Code's charitable contribution deduction allowed to donors, falls
somewhere in between the state-operated paradigm and the generalservices paradigm. The government clearly makes more choices in
the tax-benefits context than it does in the general-services context,
but at the same time, is less involved in the discrimination than it is in
the publicly operated single-sex school. In the provision of tax
benefits, there is always both decisionmaking by the government and
private decisionmaking. If tax benefits flow to discriminatory or
religious organizations, it is the government's decisionmaking that is
relevant to the constitutional analysis.
Tax benefits share the intermediate range of the spectrum with
numerous other types of government support of private institutions,
such as federally guaranteed student loans that help individual
students pay for tuition at single-sex schools' 28 and governmentbacked bonds that support the construction of private schools.' 29 The
theory underlying the strong version of tax expenditure analysis
seems to have much to say about those programs as well as tax
benefits.
Tax benefits are not the same as police and fire protectionthough they are wide-ranging, they are not available for all purposes.
While they are allowed significant leeway in allocating government
funds, individuals cannot choose anybody they wish to receive tax
benefits. Any program under which individuals can choose to direct
must be limited by some criteria
government funds, as tax benefits do,
30
predetermined by the government.'
In designing tax benefits, Congress makes a determination to
fund certain categories of activities. By complying with the restraints
imposed by the statutory language, the taxpayer claims an entitlement

127. This was the paradigm in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664
(1970), the seminal case in which the Supreme Court upheld the property tax exemption
of religious institutions.
128. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070.
129. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 2242 (Supp. 1971) (upheld in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973)).
130. This reasoning suggests that there can be no allocation of government funds that is
Cf. Regan v. Taxation Without
independent of the government's message.
Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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to the benefit. 131 The central issue in the constitutional analysis of tax
benefits depends on determining the government's intent in these
intermediate contexts-where the government chooses to fund some
general category of recipients, but not others. Because of the
economic equivalence of direct funding and tax-based support, the
strong version of tax expenditure analysis would equate taxpayer and
government purpose with respect to the funding of a discriminatory
or religious organization. In so doing, tax expenditure analysis fails to
identify the similarities and differences between taxing and spending
programs that are important for constitutional analysis.
Tax benefits and direct spending programs will often differ from
a constitutional perspective because they reveal different levels of
government intent: tax benefits can result from taxpayer compliance
with an entitlement based on a nondiscriminatory standard, while
direct spending programs (and state operation) are more likely to
require affirmative inclusion by the government of a discriminatory
private organization in a funding scheme. 132 It is the requirement of
both taxpayer and government action in the provision of tax benefits
that allows the government to insulate its decisions from the decisions
of the private organization. Because the Constitution imposes no
affirmative obligation on the government to exclude private
discriminatory or religious organizations from receipt of generally
available government benefits, broad provision of such benefits seems
to ensure their constitutional acceptability.
Under current doctrine, therefore, courts should find
unconstitutional government intent in tax policy where there is
evidence of a purpose to provide or specifically deny benefits to a
group that cannot be constitutionally favored or disfavored. That
determination, moreover, should focus on the level of government
policy, not the determination to fund made by the individual
taxpayer. Under this analysis, the more targeted a tax provision, the
more vulnerable it would be to constitutional attack. The more
general a provision, the less vulnerable it would be to constitutional
attack, but the less effective it would be in achieving narrow social
policy goals.
Theoretically, a tax provision could reflect the same level of
government intent as direct operation or support. The following

131. These constraints can be considerable, as they are for qualified retirement plans
governed by ERISA, or minimal, as they are for the home mortgage deduction.
132. There are, of course, many exceptions. There are government matching grant
programs that operate very much like tax deductions, in addition to the well-known direct
entitlement programs. A matching grant program could be designed in a way that
minimized the government intent behind a particular grant and the analysis presented
here could apply to that program as well.
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hypothetical tax provision would thus clearly violate the equal
protection clause: "There shall be allowed as a deduction any
contribution or gift to any educational institution that admits only
white students." The statute itself indicates government intent to
discriminate on the basis of race in the provision of tax benefits.
Separate rate schedules for minorities and whites, or deductions,
credits or exemptions explicitly tied to race would also be facially
discriminatory and therefore, unconstitutional. 133 At the other end of
the spectrum, a deduction allowed for contributions to all educational
institutions would be acceptable. The broad generality of such a
provision negates any implication of intent to discriminate on the
basis of race, even though racially discriminatory organizations could
claim benefits pursuant to the provision.
Government intent, or purpose, 34 is crucial in establishment

clause analysis as well as equal protection analysis because the state is
not allowed to prefer any particular religion, or to favor religion over
non-religion. If a tax statute evidences such an intent, then it would
run afoul of establishment clause principles. Thus, if the Code were
amended to provide that deductions are only allowed to Christian
organizations, but not other religious organizations, that provision
would be unconstitutional. At the other end of the spectrum, a
provision that allows deductions for contributions to all membership
or not-for-profit organizations would be general enough to be
constitutionally acceptable, even though it would, in fact, include
religious organizations. I will call this latter type a "generalprinciple" provision.
Many tax provisions discriminate among taxpayers on some
133. Professor McCaffery has raised an interesting equal protection question by
suggesting that we adopt a different rate schedule for married women and married men.
See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997) [hereinafter MCCAFFERY,
WOMEN]; Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look At Behavioral
Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983 (1993) [hereinafter MCCAFFERY,
Family]; and Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595 (1993). His recommendation is
based on application of the optimal tax model and empirical evidence about the elasticity
of the labor supply of married women and married men. Because married women are
more responsive to the tax costs of working, and therefore more likely to stop working if
taxes diminish their take-home pay, McCaffery argues that married women should be
taxed less so that the tax does not alter their behavior. Because discrimination on the
basis of gender has been subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, rather than the strict
scrutiny applied to race-based classifications, McCaffrey's proposal might (or might not)
pass muster under current equal protection doctrine. A similar race-based classification
would certainly violate equal protection.
134. While the literature on statutory interpretation distinguishes intent from purpose,
the courts do not seem to have picked up on this distinction. See generally, RONALD
DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE (1986); WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994).
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basis, most often the sources or uses of income, 135 and it is worth
considering two types of tax provisions to decide what level of
government intent they exhibit. The first type is what I will refer to
as laundry-list provisions, and they should be closely scrutinized for
government intent behind every item individually. The second kind
discriminates on the basis of non-suspect characteristics, often
relating to ability to pay, but benefits certain defined groups. These
provisions should be closely scrutinized for evidence of government
intent that is not on the face of the statute.
In adopting laundry-list provisions, the government can indicate
an intent to discriminate, even though it can bury that intent in the
list. For example, if Congress passes a provision that allows
deductions for contributions to Bob Jones University and the alma
maters of each of Congress' current members, with each school
individually named in the statute, the fact that Congress affirmatively
chooses to include Bob Jones University may indicate an intent to
provide benefits to an organization that discriminates on the basis of
race, despite the company it keeps in a long list of other schools that
do not so discriminate. Thus, intent to discriminate is not negated by
laundry-list provisions in the same way that it is negated by generalprinciple provisions that happen to benefit organizations that
discriminate.
Section 501(c)(3) is, of course, a laundry-list provision. It
provides that the organizations described as follows shall be exempt
136
from tax:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,
or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition..., or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation... and which does not
participate in or intervene in... any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Section 170 piggybacks on the exemptions in section 501(c)(3)
and authorizes a deduction for contributions to such organizations.
The clause in the middle of the section is the general-principle type of
provision referred to earlier-the allowance of an exemption for all
not-for-profit organizations. But the code section does not allow such
135. For example, preferential rates for capital gains, I.R.C. § 1(h); tax-free fringe
benefits, I.R.C. § 132; the home mortgage deduction, I.R.C. § 163(h).
136. I.R.C. § 501(a) operates to provide the exemption, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) describes the

organizations.
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a broad-based application. Rather, an organization must also fit
within one of the specific-purpose categories at the beginning of the
section.
While the categories do not indicate any intent to
discriminate in violation of the equal protection clause, they may
indicate intent to favor religion in violation of the establishment
clause.
On the one hand, this statutory language reflects a government
preference for religion because religious organizations automatically
qualify for the exemption (and donations to them are tax-deductible),
while secular organizations must fit into one of the other enumerated
categories in order to qualify for exemption. Section 501(c)(3) does
not make tax-based support generally available to a broadly defined
class of which religious organizations incidentally happen to be
members. Rather than describing a general principle, the list in
section 501(c)(3) is a hodgepodge of organizations with varying
purposes. 137 The support of religious organizations is explicit.
On the other hand, the breadth of section 501(c)(3) may be
sufficient to remove the government's imprimatur of support from
any particular organization claiming the exemption. 3 8 It can be
argued that a long enough laundry-list provision negates any
suggestion of special treatment for one group. This would be an
argument for treating laundry-list provisions like general-principle
provisions for purposes of determining government intent, rather
than like facially discriminatory provisions. Some have argued that
the variety of organizations and the cross-purposes to which they
aspire prove that the government does not favor any particular
message by the exemptions allowed in section 501. While that may be
true in the narrow sense, a broader perspective reveals that the
government supports religious, charitable and educational
organizations, as opposed to the broad categories of, say, political or
economic organizations.
Most of these distinctions are
constitutionally irrelevant, but the inclusion of religious organizations
is troublesome.
The laundry-list approach to the charitable deduction presents an
additional question about government intent to favor religion, due to
the rationale for the existence of the deduction. The establishment
clause's requirement of neutrality toward religion is inconsistent with
the rationale for the charitable deduction. The dominant theory

137. It is unlike the statute that provides support to all visually handicapped students,
see Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), or all
students who need remedial help, see Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
138. Cf. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (holding
the property tax exemption for churches as part of an exemption for a broad class of
property owned by nonprofit groups).
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supporting the existence of sections 501(c)(3) and 170, the subsidy
theory,139 is explicitly value-laden. The theory explains the exemption
and the corresponding deduction as a means by which the
government increases the financial support for organizations that it
wants to subsidize, usually because they produce social goods. The
subsidy theory implies that Congress approves of the organizations
listed in the statute. Thus, the inclusion of religious organizations
in
14°
the list may indicate Congressional intent to favor religion.
Other explanations for the charitable deduction, aside from the
subsidy theory, could indicate a lower level of government intent to
support religion. For example, the theory that explains the charitable
deduction as encompassing organizations that reduce the burdens of
government 4' might not imply anything about the social value of
organizations described in the section. The analysis under this theory
is more of a functional analysis-what do governments do? Any
organization that performs government functions, whether they are
good or bad, would be eligible for the deduction, so the statute would
not necessarily indicate government intent to favor religion. The
individual choice at the funding level would essentially allow citizens

to decide which functions of government are important enough to be
funded. The problem with employing this theory to decide an
establishment clause issue is that the inclusion of religious
organizations among the allowable recipients is impossible to
explain. 42
Turning to the second type of provision, the Code often
139. See Evelyn Brody, Charitiesin Tax Reform Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert
11 (presented at NYU Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, April 16, 1998)
(manuscript on file with the author); Gergen, supra note 126, at 1394-96.
140. Even if the statute indicates that the government favors religion, it may not be
unconstitutional if it reduces government entanglement with religion or if it is required by
the free exercise clause. For a discussion of other factors, aside from intent, that are
important in establishment clause doctrine, see infra notes 258-295 and accompanying text.
141. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that "these
organizations... bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by general
taxation or be left undone."). It has been argued that the origins of the deduction could
not have been explained on this theory. See Lars G. Gustafsson, 'Lessening the Burdens of
Government': Formulating a Test for Uniformity and Rational Federal Income Tax
Subsidies,45 KAN. L. RaV. 787,801 (1997).
142. Under any reading of the establishment clause to date, government is not
permitted to operate a church itself, so there is no explanation for how religious
organizations, apart from their non-religious activities, come to fulfill the functions of
government. Empirical evidence reveals that the public benefits functions of religious
organizations are minimal compared to their other activities. See Jeff E. Biddle, Religious
Organizations, in WHO BENEFTrS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 92, 98 (Charles T.
Clotfelter ed., 1992) [hereinafter WHO BENEFITs] (public benefit expenditures constitute
3% of total expenditures of religious congregations, sacramental expenditures constitute
over 60%).
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discriminates either on the basis of some notion of ability-to-pay, 143 or
because Congress wants to encourage certain economic activity.
Thus, the Code allows deductions for extraordinary medical
expenses' 44 and contributions to retirement savings accounts. 145 It
often discriminates on the basis of income, phasing out benefits for
high-income taxpayers"46 and providing refundable credits targeted to
low-income taxpayers. 47 As a by-product of the joint filing system, it
gives some couples a "marriage bonus" and others a "marriage
To the amusement of many law students, the
penalty."'14
"nondiscrimination" provisions in the Code have nothing to do with
equal protection, but rather refer to high-income and low-income
taxpayers.

49

Congress might include an apparently benign distinction in the
Code precisely because it is linked, in fact, to a racial classification.
Thus, if Congress designs the joint filing system with the intent to
discriminate against minority couples or with the intent to tax women
at a higher rate than men,150 then the provision should be subject to
an equal protection challenge, and under current law, it would be.
However, the problem of proving discriminatory intent in such a case
is likely to be overwhelming.'51
143. The meaning of taxation based on ability to pay is not self-evident, and I leave for
another day the discussion of whether the law's sensitivity to ability to pay tax is distinct
from its encouragement of economic activity.
144. See I.R.C. § 213.
145. See I.R.C. § 219(a).
146. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (personal exemptions); I.R.C. § 219(g) (IRA
deduction); I.R.C. § 68 (itemized deductions); I.R.C. § 25A(c) (Hope and Lifetime
Learning credits).
147. See I.R.C. § 32 (EITC); I.R.C. § 24 (child credit).
148. See generally, Christian, supra note 57; Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism.
Competing Goals and ConstitutionalChoices,96 COLuM. L. REV. 2001,2009-2033 (1996).
149. See I.R.C. § 1320)(1) (allowing classification for fringe benefits that do not
"discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees"); I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)(qualified
pension plans may not "discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees").
150. Under the joint filing system, the secondary earner-the spouse who earns less-is
taxed at the primary earner's marginal rate on the first dollar of income. Because the
primary earner can be said to earn the first family dollars, the primary earner enjoys the
benefit of the progressive rate schedule and the family's exemptions, and the secondary
earner is subject to a higher average rate of tax. Thus, some have argued for individual
filing. See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A ComparativeStudy of Income
Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971); Pamela B. Gann,
AbandoningMaritalStatus as a Factorin Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV.
1 (1980).
151. See infra notes 189-194 and accompanying text. A discussion of standing to
challenge the constitutionality of tax provisions is beyond of the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that there are significant standing hurdles
that prevent taxpayers from challenging provisions that they believe contrary to
constitutional norms. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
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The most likely source of evidence of discriminatory intent

behind tax provisions is legislative history, which is plentiful and
readily accessible for federal tax legislation, particularly for recently
enacted changes in the Code. 152 However, drafters of relevant
contextual materials, knowing the constitutional standard, would be
foolish to include any indicia of discriminatory intent, particularly if a
nondiscriminatory explanation is available to provide a plausible
interpretation of the statute. Because this type of statute often has an
income-related distinction, it is easy to explain it on the basis of
ability to pay or consistency and coherence within the Code. Any
distinction based on income is presumptively neutral because it is
relevant to the revenue-raising functions of the tax law, and therefore,
protected from charges of unconstitutional intent.
In addition, reliance on legislative history as an accurate
indicator of Congressional intent is contrary to the lessons of much
recent scholarship. 153 Public choice theory,154 which is a major force
in contemporary tax scholarship, makes the possibility of an
identifiable government intent to discriminate seem absurd. To the
contrary, public choice theory suggests that "legislative policy is often
fragmentary and irrational."'155 Given the general amalgamation of
numerous tax provisions and other budget provisions in one bill, it
would be extraordinary to find a discriminatory purpose explaining a
statute's adoption, 56 and where legislation is the product of interest
group agitation and legislative horse-trading, it might be hard to find
any identifiable purpose at all. 15 7 In tax legislation, intense lobbying
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (holding that there is no standing to challenge
IRS decision to fail to collect tax from someone else). The substantive analysis contained
in this Article assumes that a challenger is heard by the courts.
152. Tax legislation is always accompanied by committee reports, and the tax press
follows the day to day developments in Congress as legislation is being considered,
recording statements of members, and publishing the text of proposals that do not become
law.
153. "Courts speak the language not of public choice and practical reason, but of
legislative intent, legislative purpose, and the plain meaning rule." Michael Livingston,
Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax
Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REV.819, 871 (1991).
154. Public choice theory is the application of economics to political science. See
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 2 (1989). Public choice models treat legislation
as the product of interest groups who are trying to extract benefits for themselves. See
Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873,878 (1987).
155. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275, 295 (1988).
156. Cf. Livingston, supra note 153, at 872-73 (arguing that because of the detailed
omnibus nature of tax legislation, published sources may not reveal the intent of tax
legislation).
157. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533 (1982).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.50

and large campaign contributions are standard, suggesting active
interest group participation in the process. 158 Many legislators are not
interested in learning the technical details of the Code, and therefore,
may barely understand the provisions that they vote on. 159 Code

provisions, like other federal legislation, are endorsed for different
reasons by different legislators. 60 If public choice theory is accurate
and legislation is largely the result of rent-seeking interest groups and
politicians acting in their own self-interest, 16' then there is little room
for legislation to be propelled by either good public policy, 162 as we
hope, or a specific intent to discriminate, as we fear.
Furthermore, focusing on legislative intent in tax statutes may be
inconsistent with the general approach to interpreting tax statutes,
making intent more difficult to discover, and possibly concealing
discriminatory intent. Commentators have argued that because of its
special nature, the tax law lends itself to a different method of
interpretation than other statutes; 163 the Code's internal logic and
coherence may be more important than the original intent of
Congress in the day-to-day interpretation of tax statutes.' 64 Purposive
approaches to statutory interpretation' 65 that try to make the
disparate parts of the Code hang together have long prevailed in the
"substance over form" and "step transaction" doctrines, under which
the government wins even though the taxpayer complied with the

158. But see Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulchv A
ProceduralDefense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166
(1993) (using empirical evidence to argue that tax writing committees are less likely to be
captured by interest groups than other Congressional committees).
159. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 47, at 77. The tax-writing committees
vote on concepts rather than statutory language. See Livingston, supra note 153, at 833-37.
160. The Supreme Court has recognized this. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,265 (1977).
161. See Easterbrook, supra note 157.
162. For a discussion of the public interest theory of legislation, see Shaviro, Beyond
Public Choice, supra note 101.
163. See Bradford L. Ferguson et al., Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax
Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 806
(1989) ("Federal tax statutes and the legislative process that produces them differ from
other legislation in such degree that the difference is tantamount to a difference in kind.").
But see Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994).
164. Livingston, supra note 153, at 828; see also Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax
Legislation:The Role of Purpose,2 FLA. TAX. REV. 492, 497 (1995) ("One component of
statutory purpose in the income tax is the fundamental structure underlying the income
tax."); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal
Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986).

165. See HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994).
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166
literal terms of the statute.

A focus on the logic of the Code skews the interpretation of tax
statutes away from discriminatory intent because such intent would
necessarily represent a departure from any structure underlying the
Code. If courts try to make the Code more internally consistent, then
they might read out unconstitutional intent. While the internal logic
of the Code may be useful in analyzing how different parts of the
Code affect one another, it is irrelevant to the question of
unconstitutional discriminatory intent. While there may be "basic
features" of the Code that remain the same even as the Code is
constantly amended, 167 the addition of myriad miscellaneous
provisions into the Code undermines the coherence of the Code as a
whole, and increases the likelihood that a non-tax-based explanation,
possibly an unconstitutional one, best explains Congressional intent.
In sum, the central question under both the equal protection and
establishment clauses in evaluating tax benefits focuses on
government intent behind the relevant section of the Code. While
some hypothetical tax provisions present clear evidence of
government intent, most actual Code provisions do not. Generalprinciple provisions are generally immune from constitutional attack
because they show insufficient government intent to favor any group.
Laundry-list provisions are more likely to indicate government intent
to provide targeted benefits, and the laundry-list in section 501(c)(3)
may indicate government intent to favor religion. Finally, challenges
to income-based classifications with discriminatory impact face very
substantial hurdles because of the difficulty of proving government
intent to unlawfully discriminate. Nevertheless, because the tax law
has been increasingly called upon to carry out specific federal policies
in a wide variety of areas, the constitutional limitations on tax
provisions may become more significant than they have been in the
past; a provision that benefits a small group of taxpayers may provide
benefits solely to racist, sexist, or religious organizations. The general
availability of most tax benefits to a broad range of recipients is what
ensures their constitutional acceptability under current law. By
focusing on intent, the courts have limited Congress' ability to
narrowly target tax-based support to organizations that it may not
constitutionally fund directly. The constitutional standard thus limits
the Code's ability to reflect narrow unconstitutional preferences.
C.

Tax Expenditure Analysis and Equal Protection

With the methodology described in the prior section, I now
166. See Geier, supra note 164, at 495-96.
167. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, 1997 Supplement to FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION iv
(8th ed. 1997).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.50

return to tax-based aid to discriminatory schools and the role of tax
expenditure analysis in judging violations of equal protection. It is
well settled that the state may not operate a racially segregated school
system,168 and is now clear that the state may not operate a college
exclusively for men without offering an equivalent opportunity for
women. 169 The question to now directly consider is whether the state
may constitutionally provide tax-based support to private institutions
that engage in such discrimination. The strong version of tax
expenditure analysis, with its focus on economic equivalence, would
equate tax-based support of such institutions with direct government
support. Therefore, the strong version of tax expenditure analysis
would lead one to conclude that allowing a charitable deduction for
contributions to single-sex schools is equivalent to the government
sending a check to those schools in the amount of the donors' tax
savings. 170
The problem with the application of the strong version of tax
expenditure analysis to the constitutionality of tax benefits available
to discriminatory schools under the charitable contribution deduction
is that it treats economic equivalence as constitutionally decisive,
while equal protection doctrine does not. Current Supreme Court
interpretation of the equal protection clause reflects an "antidiscrimination" principle:' 7 ' the government is not permitted to
discriminate on the basis of race or sex. This is why the intent
requirement, described above, is central. Under the Supreme Court's
decision in Washington v. Davis, it will only subject a statute to
heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause if the statute is
facially discriminatory, 72 or if it has a discriminatory effect and was
adopted with a discriminatory purpose. 73 If a facially neutral statute
has only a discriminatory effect, the Court will apply rational basis
review, even if the legislature knew that the statute would have a
disproportionate effect on an identifiable group. 74 The economic
equivalence of tax benefits and direct spending would be crucial in

168. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
169. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996).
170. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
171. See TRIBE, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, supra note 115, § 16-21.
172. Since there are no distinctions expressly based on race or gender in the Code, tax
statutes are immune from facial attack. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,248 (1976),
the court noted the potential vulnerability of tax statutes (among others) in explaining the
Court's decision to require proof of discriminatory intent under the equal protection
clause.
173. See id at 239-42.
174. See Massachusetts v. Feeney, 429 U.S. 66 (1976). Racial distinctions are subject to
strict scrutiny and gender-based distinctions are subject to intermediate scrutiny.
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determining whether a tax provision has disparate effects,175 but it
sheds little light on whether the government intended to discriminate.
The courts have only once explicitly equated the provision of tax

benefits in an equal protection case with direct government spending.
Applying tax expenditure analysis to an equal protection chalienge,
Judge Bazelon, in McGlotten v. Connally, compared the section 170
deduction to a government matching grant, 176 relying on the rhetoric
of tax expenditure analysis 177 to distinguish such grants from "the

structure of an income tax based on ability to pay.' 78 The court there
struck down, on constitutional grounds, deductions for contributions
to fraternal orders that discriminated on the basis of race. 179 Taken

together, McGlotten and VMI provide some support for arguing that
80
tax benefits to private single-sex institutions are unconstitutional.
However, that support is quite thin.
Supreme Court doctrine, though sparse in this area, supports this

conclusion regarding the relevance of tax expenditure analysis. The
only time that the Supreme Court has considered tax-based support

of a discriminatory organization, in Bob Jones University v. United
States,181 it upheld the Commissioner's denial of exemption on

statutory grounds' 82 but avoided the constitutional question. VMI
invites us to reconsider the Court's refusal to adopt the strong version

of tax expenditure analysis in that case. 183 The Bob Jones University
175. See Part fl.D. infra.
176. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448,455-57,461 (D.D.C. 1972).

at 456 n.37, 462 n.68.
177. He also cited Professor Surrey. See id.
178. I&at457.
179. Courts have generally not been comfortable adopting tax expenditure analysis into
constitutional adjudication. In an important equal protection case challenging tax benefits
for discriminatory organizations, the same district court that decided McGlotten avoided a
constitutional holding by finessing the question of whether tax-based support is legally
equivalent to direct support, even while it invalidated the tax exemptions of racially
discriminatory organizations. See Green v. Connally, 339 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65 (D.D.C.
1971), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). While indicating its familiarity
with the reasoning of tax expenditure analysis, the Green v. Connally court declined to rest
its holding on that reasoning.
180. Of course, tax-based support to single-sex institutions might withstand the
intermediate standard of scrutiny that the Court applies to gender discrimination, even if
the equivalent tax-based support failed under the strict scrutiny standard applied to the
race discrimination at issue in McGlotten.
181. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
182. Bob Jones University forbade interracial dating between students, and threatened
expulsion for those students who advocated interracial marriage. Following the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Runyon v. McCrary, 515 F.2d 1082 (1975), affd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976),
Bob Jones University opened its admissions policies to students of all races. See Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. at 580. The Supreme Court had previously held that laws restricting
interracial marriage violated the equal protection clause. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1968).
183. But see SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX ExPENDrrTURES, supra note 13 at 131-32
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case established a public policy limitation for organizations described
in section 501(c)(3): in addition to fitting within one of the

enumerated statutory categories (such as religious or educational), an
organization must be charitable in the common-law sense in order to
qualify for the exemption. Because Bob Jones University's policies
on interracial dating and marriage contravened well-settled national
policy against racial discrimination in education, it did not qualify as
charitable, and therefore, the Court found that the184IRS had been
correct in revoking the university's tax-exempt status.
The Court could have struck down the exemption on
constitutional grounds by applying the strong version of tax
expenditure analysis and reasoning from established precedent
prohibiting direct aid to racially discriminatory schools. 185 If it had
adopted the strong version of tax expenditure analysis, its earlier
decision in Norwood v. Harrison,prohibiting state textbook loans to
segregated private schools, would likely have been controlling
because that case could have been interpreted to mean that no
equivalent economic aid' 86 could flow to segregated schools. But
instead, the Court construed the meaning of "charitable" and
concluded that racially discriminatory schools could not qualify.187
The Court cited its own earlier Norwood decision as only one of
many cases evincing a fundamental public policy against race
discrimination in education.'88
The Court's approach, though criticized, 89 is consistent with its
(stating that the Court's decision "reflected ... [an] increasing sophistication concerning
tax expenditure provisions."); Charles 0. Galvin and Neal Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis
of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1353, 1370 (1983) (concluding
that the majority favored the tax expenditure viewpoint).
184. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595.
185. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973)
186. While the programs clearly operated differently, the dollar benefit to private
schools certainly could have been the same.
187. This was the case even though Bob Jones University was clearly an "educational"
institution per I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and even though Bob Jones University claimed a free
exercise justification for its policies.
188. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 593.
189. Although commentators have criticized Bob Jones's approach of adding a common
law charitableness requirement and allowing the IRS to determine which organizations
contravene public policy, it continues to be the law. See, Note, The Independent Sector
and the Tax Laws: Defining Charity in an Ideal Democracy, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1991);
Note, The Revocation of Tax Exemptions and Tax Deductions for Donations to 501(c) (3)
Organizationson Statutory and Constitutional Grounds, 30 UCLA L. REV. 156, 172-74
(1982). But see SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXt'ENDrrURES, supra note 13, at 127
(arguing that the tax benefits provided to charitable organizations necessarily made the
IRS a participant in defining racial policies). Whether it was wise for the Court to refine
the statutory definition by adding the public policy limitation, the resulting precedent is
much narrower than it would have been if the Court had held that direct expenditures and
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interpretation of the equal protection clause. Given the strong intent
requirement under current doctrine, tax-based aid to discriminatory

schools would be unconstitutional only if a court finds evidence of a
government purpose to discriminate in the taxing scheme.

The

charitable contribution deduction is the key provision, and there is no
evidence that it was adopted with government intent to
discriminate. 19° Neither the foreseeability that aid would flow to a
discriminatory institution nor the private discriminatory intent of
supporters of Bob Jones University (and Smith College) is relevant to

the constitutionality of the taxing scheme. A more fulsome
interpretation of equal protection would be necessary to impose an
affirmative obligation on the government to withhold from certain
classes of recipients benefits that are generally available on an

entitlement basis.' 9 '
The racial and gender bias in the Code, while clearly present, 192 is
too subtle to be explained by any explicit discriminatory purpose-it

is in the choices that Congress makes as compared to the choices it
might have made. 9 3 The purpose may reflect a subtle or coded

gender or racial bias. Although it is unthinkable that any committee
report would offer an explicitly racist or sexist reason for its
legislation, some of the arguments made in debates over tax
legislation can be interpreted as discriminatory rhetoric aimed at
particular groups. For example, the call for protection of the
traditional family through the Code, made explicitly by some

tax expenditures are constitutional equivalents.
In addition to its doctrinal moderation, Bob Jones reflects an institutional
compromise-Congress generally has unfettered power in questions of taxation, while the
courts are the final arbiters of individual rights. If tax expenditure analysis is
constitutionalized so that the holding of VMI must apply to tax subsidies because they are
equivalent to direct grants, then the courts would have to distinguish "real" taxes from
spending through the Code.
190. There is also no evidence that it is administered in a discriminatory way. See infra
notes 214-218 and accompanying text.
191. See Part I.D. infra.
192. See e.g., Christian, supra note 57; McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality, supra
note 133; Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue

Code, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 751.
193. For example, in 1997 Congress chose to grant a tax credit to all families with
children, rather than increasing the credit for families with work-related child-care
expenses. Compare I.R.C. §§ 24 and 21. This choice increases the tax benefits available
for families already benefiting from the imputed income enjoyed (but not taxed) when one
spouse stays home to take care of the children. Although Congress did not consider these
two choices as alternatives to one another, the choice it made, compared to a narrow
range of alternative choices dealing with the same issue (the cost of raising children) shows
that Congress failed to choose the route that would have more directly encouraged women
to remain in the workforce while raising children.
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legislators, 194 can be interpreted as an argument against workplace
equality for women or intolerance for homosexuals.
Although discriminatory purpose may be speculative or
ambiguous, many tax provisions have discriminatory effects.195 Some
provisions seem to disproportionately burden blacks compared to
whites. 196 For example, the marriage penalty/bonus in the current
rate structure, which is an unavoidable by-product of a progressive
system that allows joint filing,197 is more likely to impose a penalty on
black couples and a bonus on white couples due to the different

income and work patterns of black and white couples. 9 8 The
alternative to a joint filing system, mandatory individual filing, would,
therefore, have a less discriminatory effect on black couples.
Similarly, the home mortgage deduction disproportionately benefits
whites, who are more likely to own homes than blacks, and has been

claimed to contribute to racial segregation in housing. 199
Facially neutral tax provisions also operate to create behavioral
biases that prevent women from achieving full economic equality. 20°
The joint filing system often imposes high average rates of tax on
married women's income because wives are more likely than
husbands to be secondary wage earners.2

1

The child tax credit 202

operates to discriminate against working women because it is equally
available to families with untaxed imputed income from household

services (i.e. where the wife stays at home) and families who must pay
for such services with after-tax income. Congress' alternative choice
of providing an equally valuable child care credit would have been
194. See, e.g., Contract with America, 140 CONG. REC. H9526-01 (Rep. Gingrich
outlines the contract).
195. Discriminatory impact may be sufficient for a violation of statutory provisions. In
McGlotten v. Connally, the court considered whether the tax benefits at issue violated the
Civil Rights Act. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
196. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 192.
197. But can be mitigated by legislation such as a credit or a deduction for a second
wage earner. The Code had such a deduction from 1981 through 1986. See prior I.R.C. §
221 (Deduction for Two-Earner Married Couples), adopted in Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, P.L. 97-34 § 103(a), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514 § 131(a).
198. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in
TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996). Whether a
particular couple has a marriage penalty or bonus under the current rate structure
depends on their joint income and each spouse's relative share of it. Generally, couples in
which one spouse earns less than 20% of the total family income receive a marriage bonus
and spouses who each contribute equally to family income suffer the greatest marriage
penalty. See id. at 47.
199. John A. Powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policies Have Racially
SegregatedAmerica, in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 198, at 92-93.
200. See MCCAFFERY, FAMILY, supra note 133.
201. See Blumberg, supra note 150; Christian, supra note 57; Gann, supra note 150.
202. I.R.C. § 24, adopted in Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 105-34 § 101.
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more advantageous to families with women in the workplace, and
could have partially alleviated the penalty that two-earner couples
suffer from joint filing.
Despite their discriminatory effects, these provisions will not
trigger heightened scrutiny absent a showing of discriminatory intent.
be explained by a variety of
Moreover, all these provisions can
"neutral" nondiscriminatory goals.203 The joint filing system offers
"couples neutrality," taxing equal-earning couples equally, regardless
of the allocation of earnings within the couple. 204 The home mortgage
deduction encourages home ownership and the community stability
that such ownership provides. The child credit recognizes the
reduced ability to pay tax of families who must support children, and
can be understood as an extension of the dependency exemption. 205
The tax law seems to have a disproportionate impact on racial
minorities partially because of the unequal distribution of wealth in
this country.2°6 Facial distinctions in the Code are often based on
income level, but the Supreme Court has held that the poor are not a
suspect class, and therefore, differentiation based on economic status
does not give rise to strict scrutiny. 2° 7 Thus, many provisions that

burden blacks compared to whites can be justified based on
arguments about economic status, rather than race.208 Congressional
decisions about taxation that can be defended on the basis of income
measurement and differentiation based on income will always have a
203. As Professor Alstott has pointed out, the concept of neutrality in the tax law is
somewhat unclear, and seems to include both the idea of "equal taxation" as well as the

economic concept of "decisional neutrality." See Alstott, supra note 148, at 2012-14. The

idea of neutrality in equal protection jurisprudence is clearly not the decisional neutrality.
of economic analysis. In requiring that policymakers make race-blind decisions, it may be

closer to the idea of equal taxation. This concept of neutrality implies an absence of taint
from racist motivations. If tax provisions are adopted solely to raise revenue, then they
are protected from equal protection challenge because they lack government intent to

discriminate. See Part II.B. infra. The idea of race-neutrality has been criticized in the
equal protection literature. See, e.g., BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE:
WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW (1998) (explaining how "transparent" white
decisionmaking, which is ostensibly race-neutral, perpetuates white racial advantage).
204. See Bittker, supra note 77; Ferguson, supra note 163.
205. See I.R.C. § 151.
206. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Tables 717, 719, 723, 726,
742 (1997) (providing comparisons of income for white and black households); KEVIN
PHILLIPS, THE POLITIcS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFrERMATH 207 (1990) (showing that the typical black
family's income is only 56% of typical white family's income).
207. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
208. Since there is no constitutional prohibition, disparate effects on the poor are
virtually guaranteed to pass constitutional muster. Professors Beverly Moran and William
Whitford have argued that the Code systematically disfavors blacks, even if income is held
constant. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 192, at 757.
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209
rational basis justification.

Even if tax statutes are safe from constitutional attack,
administration of the tax laws may still be subject to equal protection
challenge even without resort to tax-expenditure analysis.2 10 The
Code is only the beginning of the large government bureaucracy that
taxes the citizens, and it has lately become much more fashionable to
attack the Internal Revenue Service than the Congress. 2 ' The
Supreme Court has been willing to invalidate administrative practices
pursuant to statutes, even where the statutes themselves are
nondiscriminatory. 212 Thus, the intent requirement can be satisfied at
pattern of purposeful
the level of administrative decisionmaking if a213
discrimination in administration can be proven.
For example, even if section 501(c)(3) of the Code is general
enough to pass constitutional muster on its face, application of that
section to authorize exemptions for racially discriminatory private
schools, such as Bob Jones University, could potentially violate equal
protection. That conclusion would depend on the constitutional
significance of the Internal Revenue Service's decision to grant a tax
exemption to racially discriminatory organizations. One can argue
that the government actively approves of a private party's
discrimination by affirmatively granting a discriminating party an
exemption and placing that organization on the official and public list
of approved organizations. 214 That list could be evidence that "so
implicates the federal government in a private [person]'s activities
that, as a matter of substantive equal protection law, the government
becomes a partner in the [private person's] purposeful...

209. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
210. Perhaps the administration of prior Code § 1071 would have been vulnerable to an
equal protection attack. That section relied on FCC certification, which the FCC would
provide to encourage minority ownership of radio stations, even though the statute did not
contain any race-based criterion. Congress repealed § 1071 in 1995 in the Self-Employed
Health Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 104-7, 109 Stat. 93 (1995).
211. If discriminatory intent is the search for evil thoughts, taxpayers seem to be
looking for (and finding) it in the Internal Revenue Service. See, e.g., Paul Wiseman,
Witnesses Tell HorrorStory of Rogue IRS Agent, USA Today, May 1, 1998, at 3A; Taxing
Trauma: Tales of IRS Abuses Against Taxpayers Require Immediate Action, Los Angeles
Daily News, Sept. 26, 1997, at N24. See also, Senate Finance Committee, Hearing on
Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service. Sept. 23,1997 (1997 WL 586011
Federal Document Clearing House).
212. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954).
213. Yick Wo court found that the ordinance had been applied "with a mind so unequal
and oppressive to amount to a practical denial by the State of equal protection[.]" 118 U.S.
at 373.
214. See Internal Revenue Service, PUBLICATION 78 (CUMULATIVE LIST OF EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS).
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discrimination. '215 Placement on the list of exempt organizations
could constitute evidence of government intent to discriminate by its
affirmative choice to grant a tax benefit to a discriminatory
organization.
While the existence of a list of approved organizations compiled
by the government provides a potential hook onto which an equal
protection claim can be hung, it is nevertheless a problematic
approach under current law. The grant of an exemption to an
organization that discriminates is unlikely to reflect any pattern by
the administrator that is "unexplainable on grounds other than
race. '216 An exemption would ordinarily be granted because the
organization fulfills the requirements of the statute despite the fact
that it discriminates, not because of it.217 Therefore, the link between
government intent and private discrimination would generally be very
weak in the allowance of tax exemptions. Although they theoretically
could, exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools never
rose to the level of a pattern of administrative practice that resembles
the Service never
practices struck down by the Court:218
systematically favored discriminatory organizations over nondiscriminatory organizations in its grant of exemptions.
Thus, because the Supreme Court's standard requires
discriminatory purpose under Washington v. Davis, if the Internal
Revenue Service had not revoked Bob Jones University's tax
exemption on statutory grounds, its revocation would not have been
required by the Constitution. By the same token, tax-based aid to
single-sex private schools pursuant to the charitable contribution
deduction are not constitutionally equivalent to VMI. Nevertheless,
single-sex schools are not necessarily home free. Even without the
constitutionalization of tax expenditure analysis, the combination of
Bob Jones and VMI may still threaten the continued enjoyment of
tax-based support by private sex-segregated institutions. 21 9 Bob Jones
215. TRIBE, CONSTrruTiONAL LAW, supra note 115, § 18-7, at 1720 n.29.

216. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
217. Cf Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979).
218. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that none of the Chinese
applicants received variances from the ordinance); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960) (gerrymandering only explainable as attempt to disenfranchise blacks).
219. A different reading of the Court's opinion in VMI may suggest another
constitutional infirmity of tax-based support of single-sex educational institutions. VMI
may mean that the government may support single-sex institutions only if it supports male
and female institutions equally. This reading follows from the Court's conclusion that
Virginia's proposal for an all-women's institution was not equal to VMI, and therefore,
could not cure the state's exclusion of women from VMI. Assuming that the separate-butequal principle means either that the amount of support must be equal or that the
institutions must be equal, tax-based support is problematic because it is impossible to
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created the potential for broad application of a public policy
limitation to the Code.220 VMI might be the crucial precedent for
Smith and Wellesley, not because it makes tax-based aid to single-sex
educational institutions unconstitutional, but because it establishes
that such support is contrary to public policy.22' The public policy
approach-whatever public policy is found to be22-is a more likely
guarantee that tax-based support will actually provide equal financial benefit to different
kinds of institutions. Because of the entitlement-like nature of tax-based support, the
government cannot ensure that the amounts of support provided to male and female
institutions is in fact equal or that the institutions themselves are equal. This stems from
the fact that spending through the tax code is not subject to appropriation by Congress,
and the government cannot necessarily predict how many taxpayers will avail themselves
of the benefits.
220. See Harvey P. Dale, Public Policy Limits on Tax Benefits: Bob Jones Revisited
(Tax Forum No. 459, April 2, 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) at 23-26.
See also Paul B. Stephan III, Bob Jones University v. United States: Public Policy in
Searchof Tax Policy, SUP. Cr. REV. 33, 77 (1983) (arguing that the contours of the public
policy doctrine are very difficult to define).
221. In Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1163 (D.D.C. 1971), the district court
wrote that Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), proclaimed the policy against
racial segregation in education, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1163 (D.D.C. 1971), suggesting that a
judicial statement may pronounce a policy.
While Bob Jones was being considered by the Supreme Court, the Reagan
Administration noted the possible effects that it could have on single-sex institutions, and
even referred to Smith College in explaining why it changed its position in the litigation
from supporting the IRS's determination to supporting Bob Jones University's exemption.
For the background to the Bob Jones case and a description of the Administration's flipflop policy regarding exemptions for racially discriminatory schools, see Dale, supra note
220, at 10-14; Note, Tax-Exempt Status of DiscriminatoryPrivateSchools, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
261, 262 n.15 (1983). The Supreme Court invited William T. Coleman, Jr., to brief and
argue as amicus curiae in support of the judgments below. 456 U.S. 922 (1982).
222. One can argue that Smith's eligibility for exemption under section 501(c)(3) should
not be affected by VMI, reading Bob Jones narrowly, and interpreting "charitable" in
section 501(c)(3) as failing to apply only to organizations that engage in racial
discrimination. After the Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones, the IRS could have used
the public policy principle aggressively to deny or revoke exemptions from many
organizations, and some commentators were afraid that the IRS would use its authority to
favor particular organizations. See Galvin & Devins, supranote 183, at 1372-3. However,
the IRS has generally limited its attacks to organizations practicing racial discrimination.
See, e.g., Virginia Educ. Fund v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 743 (1985), affd 799 F.2d 903 (4th
Cir. 1986); Prince Edward Sch. Found. v. Commissioner, 478 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1979).
This administrative practice provides some support for the argument that the public policy
limitation is only about racial discrimination. This interpretation of the public policy
limitation must rest on a distinction between the public policy against racial discrimination
and the public policy against gender discrimination. Those distinctions have certainly
been made. While there are statutes prohibiting both race and sex discrimination, the sex
discrimination statutes reflect some tolerance for disparate treatment of men and women.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(A)(5) (providing exception to Title IX for traditionally single-sex
institutions). Similarly, courts have subjected sex discrimination to an intermediate level
of scrutiny, rather than the strict scrutiny applied to race discrimination. See, e.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76
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interpretation of VM~s effect on the tax benefits of private single-sex
223
institutions than the constitutional interpretations suggested above.
As Justice Scalia wrote in his VMI dissent: "it is certainly not beyond
the Court that rendered today's decision to hold that a donation to a

single-sex college should be deemed contrary to public policy and
therefore not deductible if the college discriminates on the basis of
sex.

22 4

If gender discrimination is uncharitable, the public policy

exception to charitable status will have to apply to gender
2
discrimination as well. 25
The crucial difference between prohibiting tax-based support to
single-sex institutions pursuant to the public policy limitation and
prohibiting that support based on the functional equivalence
highlighted by tax expenditure analysis is in the constitutionalization
of the prohibition. If VMI establishes the existence of a fundamental
public policy against gender discrimination in education so that tax
exemptions for such schools violate public policy under Bob Jones,
Congress could change that result by indicating a contrary
understanding of public policy 2 26 Of course, a constitutional holding
would mean that it could not.227
(1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). Nevertheless, if the public policy limitation in Bob
Jones were only meant to apply to racial discrimination, then it is curious that the Supreme
Court established a "public policy" exception, rather than a racial discrimination
exception to charitable status under section 501(c)(3).
The law of charitable trusts does not resolve this issue. In fact, the Restatement cites
Bob Jones as the principle current case in the definition of public policy for purposes of
charitable trust law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 (c)(Supp.); see also
AusTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr, LAW OF TRUSTS (4th ed. 1989) § 377, p. 376.
223. See text and notes 22-23, supra.
224. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2306-07 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
225. More than three years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones,
Professor Martin Ginsburg wrote that the Service's decision to allow a charitable
deduction for a gender-restricted scholarship "flagrantly disregards or misconstrues
pertinent federal judicial and legislative pronouncements and manifestly frustrates federal
policy." Martin D. Ginsburg, Sex Discrimination and the IRS: Public Policy and the
Charitable Deduction, 10 TAX NOTEs 27 (Jan. 14, 1980). Professor Ginsburg is the
husband of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the author of VMI.
226. Congress could do so by amending I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Such an amendment could
either explicitly overrule the Court's decision to incorporate charitable trust law into the
Code, or simply undermine the argument that there exists a fundamental public policy
enunciated by all three branches of government, such as the Court found in Bob Jones.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The Bob Jones Court
recognized that public policy could evolve.
227. Some have criticized the Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones for failing to
reach the constitutional question. See Note, Constitutional Law-Religious Schools,
Public Policy, and the Constitution: Bob Jones University v. United States, 62 N.C. L.
REV. 1051 (1984); Robert M. Cover, Foreword.-Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV.
4, 67 (1983) ("the minority community... deserved a constitutional commitment to

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.50

To sum up, this section has demonstrated that equal protection

doctrine, as developed by the Supreme Court, does not fit well with
tax expenditure analysis because of the factors that the Supreme
Court has treated as important for purposes of equal protection.
Economic equivalence is not relevant to substantive equal protection
analysis. Because the charitable deduction (and the tax Code
generally) does not facially discriminate on the basis of race or gender
and can be seen as having a government intent other than

discrimination, it is safe from attack under the equal protection
clause.

At the same time, evidence is building that the tax law is
instrumental in contributing to the continued economic inequality of
minorities and women. Given that the tax law is one of the most
important governmental mechanisms for redistribution of societal
wealth, its constitutional impenetrability behind a wall of neutrality is
unfortunate. 228 The Code's virtual immunity from equal protection
analysis and the constitutional acceptability of Bob Jones University's
tax exemption should prompt the Supreme Court to reconsider
whether the intent requirement of Washington v. Davis fulfills the

goals of equal protection.22 9 Alternative doctrinal interpretations of
the equal protection clause could lead to a different conclusion, and a
different understanding of the meaning of the equal protection clause

might make tax expenditure analysis a more relevant adjudicatory
tool than it is under current law. The next section explores this idea.
avoiding public subsidization of racism"). Those who may have been nervous that
Congress could decide to overrule Bob Jones would have felt more secure with a
constitutional holding in that case. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Judgment Below, Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (No. 83-3,
81-1) (Brief of William T. Coleman). Others have praised the Court's judicial restraint.
See, Harvard Note, supra note 221. After VMI, proponents of single-sex education may be
glad that the Court took the middle road in Bob Jones, confident that Congress, in its
wisdom, would not allow tax subsidies to flow to racially discriminatory institutions.
228. Tax benefits raise a special equal protection concern worth mentioning here.
Taxpayer choice may make tax-benefit programs an effective method for implementing
direct democracy. See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 CM. L. REV. 387 (1998). While
Professor Levmore is clearly correct in his observations about how tax benefits operate to
implement direct democracy, it is not clear that direct democracy through the tax law is
desirable. Outside of the tax context, direct democracy initiatives have been used to
undermine governmental efforts at racial desegregation. See TRIBE, CONsTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 115 § 16-17, at 1485-86 (discussing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)). If increased use of
direct democracy through the Code allows taxpayers to achieve, with government funds,
goals the government would be constitutionally prohibited from achieving itself, then taxbased direct democracy would enlarge the private sphere in which the courts are unable to
remedy injustices that the government does not commit. Such a use of the tax law would
be unfortunate.
229. See infra Part II.D.
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Tax Expenditure Analysis and Alternative Interpretations of Equal
Protection

In this section, I examine how tax expenditure analysis fits into
two alternative approaches to the equal protection clause: equal
protection as anti-subordination230 and equal protection as pure
protection. 231 I discuss these alternative interpretations of the equal
protection clause to illustrate how the constitutionality of tax
provisions depends on the substantive interests protected by the
constitutional provision at issue and how the importance of economic
equivalence differs depending on those interests. In contrast to the
peripheral importance of economic equivalence under the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence discussed above, the
alternative interpretations of equal protection offered by these
constitutional scholars would treat economic equivalence as central to
the constitutional analysis. Both the anti-subordination and the pure
protection models of equal protection are concerned with ending
discrimination and its ill effects, and therefore, would require that
courts treat tax expenditures and their economically equivalent direct
expenditures alike. Both of these alternative interpretations would
be informed by tax expenditure analysis because that analysis
highlights how tax provisions and direct government programs can
equally support subordination.
Professor Ruth Colker has described the anti-subordination
approach as seeking to "eliminate the power disparities between men
and women, and between whites and non-whites, through the
development of laws and policies that directly redress those
disparities....

[I]t

focuses

on

society's

role

in

creating

subordination. ' '232
Rather than showing that there was a
discriminatory intent behind a neutral policy, as under the current
anti-discrimination interpretation of the equal protection clause, the
anti-subordination interpretation would require that the plaintiff
show disparate impact and subordination of the disadvantaged
group.233
As described in the prior section, the insuperable hurdle in
challenging the constitutionality of most tax provisions under current
law comes from the intent requirement of Washington v. Davis. By
dispensing with that element of proof, the anti-subordination
approach allows plaintiffs challenging tax provisions that have a
230. See Ruth Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove All Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REv 1003 (1986); TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW supra note 115, at 1519;
Catharine A. MacKinnon, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237-49 (1989).
231. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 20-30 (1994).

232. Colker, supranote 230, at 1007-8.
233. See id. at 1014-15.
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disparate impact on women and minorities to present a prima facie
case based on empirical evidence of the effect of facially neutral
statutes on different groups. Under this approach, once a prima facie
case is made, the government may defend its program by offering an
explanation for how the discriminatory impact alleviates
subordination of the affected group.2m
The anti-subordination approach would treat tax provisions
differently than the anti-discrimination approach because the antisubordination approach is concerned with both the intended and
unintended effects of a tax provision on groups of people. Therefore,
the financial aid that flows to private parties through the Code
becomes relevant to the constitutional inquiry regardless of
government intent or neutral explanation. The economic equivalence
of tax expenditures and direct spending is instructive because it
reveals the scope of government support of private discriminatory
practices. Under the anti-subordination approach, the economic
support that flows to private discriminators promotes subordination,
and therefore, is unconstitutional.
Pursuant to the anti-subordination interpretation, the
constitutionality of tax benefits flowing to groups and individuals
would more closely track the constitutionality of direct government
spending with the same economic effect. Any economic support of
subordination would be unacceptable; tax benefits would be
constitutionally equivalent to direct expenditures with the same
economic effect. Returning to our paradigm cases, tax benefits for
Bob Jones University would be unconstitutional because by providing
economic aid, they would support continuing subordination of blacks.
On the other hand, tax benefits for Smith College could be
constitutional as long as they help to remedy historical subordination
of women.35
Similar to the anti-subordination interpretation, the "pure
protection" or "abolitionist" understanding of equal protection

234. See id. at 1015.
235. This Article takes no position on the desirability of single-sex education for
women or the constitutionality of public single-sex education for women. Following VMI,
there has been considerable focus on these issues. See e.g., Symposium, Finding a Path to
Gender Equality: Legal and Policy Issues Raised by All-Female Public Education, 14
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. Part 1 (1997); Carrie Corcoran, Single-sex Education After
VMI: Equal Protectionand East Harlem's Young Women's LeadershipSchoo 145 U. PA.
L. REV. 987 (1997); Christopher H. Pyle, Women's Colleges: Is Segregation by Sex Still
Justifiable after United States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. REv. 209 (1997); Linda L. Peter,
What Remains of Public Choice and ParentalRights: Does the VMI Decision Preclude
Exclusive Schools or Classes Based on Gender?, 33 CAL. W. L. REv. 249 (1997); Amy B.
Bellman, The Young Women's LeadershipSchool: Single-Sex Public EducationAfter VMI,
1997 Wis. L. REv. 827 (1997).
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endorsed by Professor Robin West would treat economic equivalence
with unacceptable direct spending as central in evaluating tax
benefits. Professor West's pure protection model of equal protection
"requires the state to affirmatively protect each person's exercise of
his or her natural or human rights. '' 236 It focuses on the state's duty to
protect all people from private harm by others. If the state allows one
group to be subjected to the will of another group, then it is not
providing the subjugated group the equal protection of the laws.237
The pure protection model dispenses with both the intent
requirement of Washington v. Davis and the state action requirement
because, according to West, the equal protection clause gives the state
an affirmative obligation to protect its citizens from private
discrimination.238
If the equal protection clause is interpreted in this affirmative
manner, then the government has a much greater burden than under
the anti-discrimination approach of current law. While the antidiscrimination approach allows the government to support people
and organizations who discriminate as long as it does not explicitly
discriminate itself, the pure protection model requires that the
government take an active role in eliminating private discrimination.
Refraining from providing economic support in any form would thus
be a minimal requirement under this approach. If tax benefits
provide economic support to people who privately discriminate, then
the government violates the Constitution by assisting those people
and failing to provide protection to the subjugated citizens. "[Wjhere
the state acquiesces in th[e] subjugation [of one class of citizens to
another], the state has violated its promise of equal protection." 239
The allowance of tax benefits, even under a neutral Code provision,
would certainly constitute such acquiescence.
Thus, the economic equivalence of tax benefits and direct
spending could be illuminating to courts adjudicating equal protection
challenges to tax provisions, but only if the Court changes its
interpretation of the equal protection clause. I have described the
relevance of economic equivalence to equal protection adjudication
under current law and these alternative interpretations to
demonstrate how the qualified version of tax expenditure analysis
that I advance is sensitive to the substantive constitutional interests in
each case.

236. WEST, supra note 231, at 31.
237. West describes this conception of equal protection as ensuring the sole sovereignty
of the state. See id. at 25.
238. See iL at 34.
239. Id. at 37.
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Tax Expenditure Analysis and Establishment of Religion

This section applies the same mode of analysis already employed
in the equal protection arena to consider the constitutionality of tax
benefits under the establishment clause. Because that methodology

requires consideration of the policies underlying each constitutional
provision, this section considers the interests protected by the
establishment clause and how tax benefits and direct spending differ
with respect to those interests.

Tax benefits currently enjoyed by religious organizations amount
to substantial financial support.240 While direct funding of religious
organizations creates establishment clause concerns,241 the mere fact

of some government financial support to religious institutions is
insufficient to create an establishment of religion: the Supreme Court
has held that the government may support religious organizations as
long as that support has a secular purpose, does not have the primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not produce
excessive entanglement between the religious institution and the

state.242

240. The Tax Expenditure Budget lumps together the foregone revenue from all
charitable deductions, other than education and health, without separately listing religion.
The 1998 estimate was over $16 billion for individuals. See ANALYrICAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 5, at 44. Religious organizations collect more than $50 billion each year. See
Biddle, in WHO BENEFITS, supranote 142, at 92.
Tax benefits constitute significant financial support even if we assume that only the
deductibility of contributions, and not the exemption from tax, constitutes a government
subsidy. The tax exemption for religious organizations may be of no monetary value to
them if they would have no taxable income had they been subject to an income tax. See
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 67, at 314 (discussing the computation of taxable income
for nonprofit organizations). The greatest subsidy from the exemption may come from the
exemption of tax for endowment earnings. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals:
The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (1996).
One of the problems with both the case law and commentary analyzing the
constitutionality of tax benefits is that they are generally insensitive to the level of
economic support provided by a statutory benefit. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 117 (gets it
wrong re: economic support from state property tax exemption, which clearly provides
support even though federal income tax exemption does not), Bob Jones, (failing to
distinguish between the deductibility of contributions and exemption from tax). But see
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (analyzing 501(c)(7) as different
from 501(c)(8), from perspective of government subsidy) and Bittker & Kaufman, supra
note 19.
241. See Rosenberger v. Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,2522-23 (1995).
242. These three requirements were established by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971). While the Lemon test has been subject to
criticism, see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and ignored on occasion, see Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring, Scalia, J., dissenting), it has not
been overruled.
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Like in equal protection analysis, the economic equivalence
emphasized by tax expenditure analysis is not of primary importance
in establishment clause jurisprudence. Rather, government intent
again plays a central role, because the government may not choose to
favor religion.
Therefore, tax-based funding of religious
organizations, through the charitable deduction, may be
constitutionally
distinguishable
from
direct
government
appropriations to churches due to the separability of government
intent and taxpayer intent. 243 In addition, establishment clause
jurisprudence is concerned with the nature and degree of the
government's involvement with religion. Such concerns, which are
not raised in the equal protection context, suggest that non-economic
differences between tax benefits and direct spending may be
constitutionally relevant.
In Rosenberger v. Virginia the Supreme Court declined to
constitutionalize tax expenditure analysis in an establishment clause
case, despite Justice Thomas's plain invitation to do so. Although not
about a tax expenditure, the case implicitly rejects the functional
equivalence of tax expenditure analysis. The case arose because the
University of Virginia refused to authorize payments out of its
student activities fund for the printing costs of a student publication,
Wide Awake Productions (WAP), on the ground that the publication
was not eligible because it "primarily promote[d] ...

a particular

belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."244
In requiring WAP to be funded, the majority distinguished the
facts before it from another scenario that it conceded would be
unconstitutional"a general public assessment designed and
effected to provide financial support for a church. '245 The court
concluded that WAP's funding was different than "direct money
payments to an institution or group that is engaged in religious
activity.

' 246

The most important factor leading to this conclusion

seems to have been that the University paid outside printers, rather
than transferring the amounts directly to WAP. 247 The Court stressed
that "no public funds flow[ed] directly to WAP's coffers." 24s The
Court therefore concluded that these payments were the same as
243. This discussion assumes that direct government appropriations specifically to
churches would be unconstitutional.
244. Rosenbergerv. Virginia,515 U.S. 819, 823 (1995).

245. Id at 841. The majority wrote: "The Court of Appeals (and the dissent) are
correct to extract from our decisions the principle that we have recognized special
Establishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct money payments to
sectarian institutions." Id. at 842.
246. Id. at 842.
247. See id. at 842-45.
248. Id at 842.
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providing printing facilities to all students on a neutral basis, noting:
"It is, of course, true that if the State pays a church's bills it is
subsidizing it, and we must guard against this abuse. That is not a
danger here." 249
The Rosenberger opinion appears to set up two conditions that
must be present for a tax to violate the establishment clause: 250 (1) it
must be collected as a general public assessment, and (2) it must be
directly paid to an organization engaged in religious activity. These
conditions are formal, rather than functional, and they limit the
exactions that can violate the establishment clause. The majority's
reliance on these formal distinctions suggests that the Court would
consider the similarly formal distinctions between direct expenditures
and tax expenditures to be legally significant. Tax expenditures
would fail to constitute taxes under the Rosenberger majority's
definition of a tax: the spending inherent in tax expenditures is
indirect by definition because the subsidy never actually moves
through the government's hands to the organization's coffers. 251
For different reasons than the majority, the dissenting justices in

249. Id at 844. The majority's opinion did not explain why payment of the printer's
bills was not an equivalent subsidy. See id.
250. Rosenberger defines what constitutes a "tax" where that definition is
constitutionally relevant. The Court perceived a collision of free speech with
establishment of religion, and the choice of which of these constitutional values would
prevail turned on the definition of a tax. If the student activity fee constituted a tax, then
funding WAP would have violated the Establishment Clause; if it were not a tax, then
refusal to fund WAP would be an unconstitutional restriction on speech. See id at 840.
Although the majority conceded that the student activity fee was an "exaction upon
the students," it concluded that it was not a "tax" because it defined a tax as an amount for
the support of the government. See id at 840-41. The definition of a tax adopted by the
majority is very narrow-it must be a levy on the general public that raises revenue for the
support of the government and which the government may use for "unlimited purposes."
Id. This definition would exclude numerous exactions under current law that most people
would consider taxes such as excise taxes, federal payroll taxes that are subject to trust
fund restrictions and local property taxes that are dedicated to specific uses. In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor elaborated on the majority's definition of a tax. She
distinguished the student activity fee from a tax because (1) an objecting student might be
able to opt out of paying the fee, and (2) the fees constituted a "common pool" collected
from students that was distributed to them and by them. Id at 851-52. In contrast, the
dissent's definition of a tax was much broader; the dissenters argued that the fee was a tax
because it was collected by virtue of the coercive powers of the state. See id at 873.
251. Tax expenditure analysis conceptualizes tax expenditures as first collected and
then spent by the government, but in reality, they are taxes foregone, not taxes actually
collected and disbursed. Sometimes, tax expenditures may be direct in the sense that the
subsidy goes directly from the government to the recipient, rather than through a third
party, such as in the case of the exemption for investment income of tax-exempt
organizations. See Brown, supra note 117. However, some tax benefits, like the charitable
deduction, are also indirect in that they flow through a third party on their way to the
ultimate recipient. See infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.

March 1999]

TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS

Rosenberger also seem to reject the functional equivalence of tax
In categorizing Rosenberger as an
expenditure analysis.
unconstitutional direct funding case, the dissent distinguished it from
the constitutionally acceptable indirect-aid cases. The direct/indirect
question was critical to the dissent because in the cases of indirect aid,
such as tax benefits that flow to religious organizations by virtue of
the deduction allowed their contributors, religious institutions benefit
as a result of the choices made by individuals. The dissent argued
that the imposition of individuals between the state and the religious
institution is a distinction of substance that can support different
outcomes under the Constitution, while the distinction between
that
paying WAP's printer and paying WAP directly is a "formalism"
"cannot be the basis of a decision of Constitutional law.' z 2
Thus, eight members of the Supreme Court were unmoved by
the basic premise of tax expenditure analysis-the economic
equivalence of tax expenditures and direct expenditures-even
though their conclusions led them in opposite directions in the case at
bar. In contrast, Justice Thomas's concurrence explicitly adopted tax
expenditure analysis and used that analysis in a novel and aggressive
way.

Justice Thomas adopted tax expenditure analysis, referring to it
explicitly in arguing that direct spending should be treated the same
as indirect spending. But he parted from the Surrey school after
embracing the economic equivalence highlighted by tax expenditure
analysis and proceeded to turn its reasoning upside-down. Instead of
arguing for scrutiny of tax expenditures on the same terms as direct
expenditures, as do the advocates of tax expenditure analysis, he
argued against scrutiny for direct spending on account of the
existence of equivalent tax expenditures. Justice Thomas called upon
the longstanding acceptance of indirect aid to religion, in the form of
tax expenditures, to argue that direct spending to aid religion is
consistent with established law. Thus, Justice Thomas used tax
expenditure analysis to reach a normative conclusion about direct
spending, while Surrey used tax expenditure analysis to bring
attention to the absence of normative analysis for spending provisions
in the Code. By couching his argument in tax expenditure language,
Justice Thomas made his radical position, shared by no other member
of the court, seem grounded in current law and practice. Using tax
he argued for direct government funding of core
expenditure rhetoric,
253
religious activities.
dissenting).
252. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 886 (Scalia, J.,
253. Justice Thomas interpreted the establishment clause as requiring government
neutrality among religions, rather than as a prohibition against funding any religion. See
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 854-55. However, tax expenditure analysis cannot completely
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Notwithstanding Justice Thomas's concurrence in Rosenberger,
the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to adopt tax expenditure
analysis into the basic structure of establishment clause jurisprudence.
In Walz, the landmark case in which the Supreme Court upheld a
property tax exemption for churches, the Court refused to legally
54
equate economically equivalent tax benefits and direct subsidies.2 It
has since refused to repudiate that stance2 5 When the Court has

invalidated tax programs that benefit religious organizations, it has
done so on a case-by-case, facts-and-circumstances basis, rather than

by wholesale adoption of tax expenditure analysis.256 While the Court

is clearly aware of the economic equivalence of tax and direct
expenditures, it has resisted the temptation to turn that economic
equivalence, despite the call of some
equivalence into constitutional 57
members of the Court to do so.2

of
The Supreme Court has identified factors other than the fact
8
financial support as important inestablishment clause analysis.25 It
support Justice Thomas's conclusion. Justice Thomas's argument requires that there be
some explanation of how tax expenditure funding of religion is neutral, without
undermining the equivalence of tax expenditure funding and direct funding on which
Justice Thomas relies. If the explanation depends on the individual choice of contributors,
then it proves too much because it supports the dissent's view that tax expenditures and
direct expenditures are not equivalent. Tax expenditures subsidize established religions
with rich adherents much more than fringe religions with poorer adherents because the
subsidy from the tax deduction for charitable contributions favors those contributors in
high tax brackets and their chosen religions. Even popular religions, which would be wellfunded if funding were determined on a per capita basis, with poor believers are less wellfunded because the tax benefits attaching to those contributions are small or nonexistent.
254. Justice Brennan wrote: "Tax exemptions and general subsidies ...are qualitatively
different [t]hough both provide economic assistance." Walz, 397 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
255. Walz has been cited numerous times in recent years. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton,
117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590
(1997); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687 (1994). For an extensive discussion of Walz, see Zelinsky, supra note 19, at 392 et
seq.
256. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). But see SURREY,
PATHWAYS, supra note 13, at 48 (arguing that both majority and dissent in Nyquist
refused to adopt different constitutional tests for direct aid and tax expenditures).
257. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,404-17 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664,704 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
258. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (federally supported special
education teachers may provide services on parochial school premises); Board of Educ. of
Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans to sectarian schools
upheld); Everson v. Board Of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (public busing of parochial school
students upheld). One exception may be Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), in which
the Court was concerned about Pennsylvania's $12 million appropriation for material and
equipment available for loan to private schools. In Meek, the Court struck down a state
program because the public aid to sectarian schools was "neither indirect or incidental"
and "even though ostensibly limited to wholly neutral, secular instructional material and
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has been particularly concerned about the appearanceof government

sponsorship of religion, and the Court has allowed financial support
to flow to sectarian institutions, as long as that support does not carry

a message of government endorsement. 59 Government may not give
the impression that it prefers a particular religion, or religion as
opposed to non-religion.

26°

The message that the government sends

by providing support to sectarian institutions seems to be more
important than the fact that there is any financial support. Therefore,

if tax-based aid fails to send a message where economically equivalent
direct aid would, then tax-based aid and direct aid may be

constitutionally distinguishable.

Under the charitable deduction,

taxpayers choose to direct their tax savings to the religious

institutions of their choosing.

The imposition of the taxpayer is

significant for purposes of the establishment clause because she
religious
disrupts the symbolic connection between the state and the
261

organization that is suspect under the establishment clause.
If the constitutional imperative turns on the government's
expression of preference for particularreligions, then tax-based aid is
distinguishable from direct aid because the general availability of the
charitable deduction treats all religions equally, and allows taxpayers,
rather than government, to choose among religions. 262 If that is all
that the establishment clause requires, then the difference between

tax-based support and direct support of religion is of constitutional
magnitude, and tax-based programs could be acceptable even where

their economically equivalent direct-spending counterparts would
not. 263

However, the administration of the exemption would be

equipment, inescapably result[ed] in the direct and substantial advancement of religious
activity." 421 U.S. at 365-66.
259. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585 (1992) (appearance of state-sponsored
religious activity dispositive).
260. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Allegheny County v. Greater
Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). See generally, Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court,29 U. Cm1. L. REV.1 (1961).
261. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) ("concert or union or
dependency" of church and state).
262. The exception to this may come from the government's necessary determination
about whether an organization is "religious" under the statute. Because the statute
includes religious organizations as an independent category, the IRS is necessarily in the
business of deciding whether an institution qualifies as "religious." See, e.g., Davis v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 806 (1983), aff'd 767 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1985); Granzow v.
Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1984) (tax fraud ministry cases). See generally,
BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 9.2 (6th ed. 1992)
(discussing the concept of "religious" in I.R.C. §501(c)(3)).
263. This seems to be Justice Thomas's view of what the framers intended that the
Establishment Clause protect. See Rosenberger v. Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 881 n.7 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
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whether the government
particularly important in determining
264
prefers some religions over others.
While individual choice is relevant to the constitutional inquiry
into government purpose to favor religion, it does not necessarily
insulate the government from establishment clause violations. The
significance of taxpayer choice depends on the government's
definition of the realm of allowable choices that individuals can make.
Only the combination of broad, neutral definitions for eligibility
determination and meaningful choice for funding recipients separates
the taxpayer's intent to favor religion from the government's intent to
subsidize a broader, more general class of recipients. 265 Where the
government narrows the allowable recipient class, then individual
choice is illusory. As discussed above, it is possible to make
arguments for and against the current-law allowance of tax-deductible
contributions to religious organizations. 266 On one hand, the
availability of the deduction to a broad range of organizations belies
any government intent to favor religion: since individual taxpayers
make the ultimate determination about where government funds go,
and can choose from a wide variety of organizations, taxpayer choice
helps to refute the claim that the government's purpose in adopting a
statute is to support religion. 267 On the other hand, the laundry-list
provision should not provide a268means of obfuscation for
unconstitutional government support.

The Supreme Court has identified excessive entanglement with
religion as an additional concern raised by the establishment clause.
Direct spending through government bureaucracy is likely to involve
greater entanglement than tax-based support.269 Taxpayer choice
makes the taxpayer the fact-finder for eligible recipients, avoiding
264. The IRS has given non-mainstream religions significant trouble. See Church of
Scientology of Ca. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (Church of
Scientology); United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983) (Unification
Church).
265. See supra Part II.B.
266. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
267. But see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
268. The laundry-list provision may mean that the government's subsidy is not available
on the neutral basis as allowed by the Court's establishment clause cases. See Witters v.
Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 475 U.S. 1091 (1986) (vocational services
available to all visually handicapped persons); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1 (1993) (state could pay for deaf student's sign language interpreter even though
student attended a religious school).
269. The Court has noted that the annual appropriations process itself presents a
"political entanglement" problem because it "provides successive opportunities for
political fragmentation and division along religious lines." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349,372 (1975).
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government entanglement with religious organizations at the
application-for-funds stage, and tax-based programs are generally
characterized by minimal monitoring of benefit recipients. 70° Taxbased aid is also less likely to present entanglement problems than
direct aid because the government does not need to deal directly with
a religious institution in providing tax-based aid to it; the charitable
deduction subsidizes the institution's donor37 1 Whereas a direct grant
is an arrangement between government and the recipient, "a tax
exemption [sic deduction] is a matching fund arrangement entered
into between government and the recipient's contributors."2 72 Thus,
tax-based and direct aid programs may involve constitutionally
distinct levels of government entanglement.
By nature, taxation requires some entanglement with all
institutions. Unlike direct spending programs, which require state
involvement only for organizations that are eligible for such
programs, the tax system affects everyone. If it grants the exemption,
it must monitor eligibility for exemption; if it does not, then it must
collect the tax.273 In some cases, this requires the Internal Revenue
Service to evaluate whether an organization is, in fact, a religion. 274
The courts prefer to avoid this question. For example, in
Hernandez v. Commissioner,275 deductions to the Church of
Scientology were disallowed on the ground that the amounts given to
the church were payments for services (albeit religious services)
rather than charitable contributions. As Justice O'Connor pointed
out in dissent, the Supreme Court's reasoning is hard to square with
the accepted deductibility of quid-pro-quo type payments to
mainstream religions.2 76 The underlying issue, which was not
explicitly addressed-but which would have made the case more
clear- was whether the Church of Scientology qualified as a religious
organization. Some might find the government's power to decide
270. While it is clear that Congress could design direct spending programs with little
administrative oversight, the fact remains that a major difference between tax
expenditures and direct spending programs is that tax programs are largely selfadministered.
271. See infra notes 289-292 and accompanying text.
272. Greenya v. George Washington University, 512 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
273. Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 692 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
274. The regulations define a church. See Treas. Reg. §1.170-2(b). See also Internal
Revenue Manual-Administration §321.3 (criteria that the IRS uses in determining
whether an organization qualifies as a church); Internal Revenue Service, Tax Guide for
Churches and Other Religious Organizations(IRS Pub. 1828) (Ann. 94-122,1994-42 I.R.B.
20); Charles Whelan, 'Church' in the InternalRevenue Code: The DefinitionalProblems,45
FORDHAM L.REV. 885 (1977).
275. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).

276. See id. at 708-712.
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what constitutes a religion for purposes of section 501(c)(3) to be an
intolerable entanglement.27 7 On the other hand, if a religious
organization is not exempt, then the government is involved with that

organization in its attempt to collect tax. Whether exemption or nonexemption produces more entanglement with religion is a question on
which people may disagree 27 8
Another

important

component

of

establishment

clause

jurisprudence focuses on whether support to religion is incidental.
The Supreme Court seems untroubled by incidental support to
religion, 279 and does not consider such support to have the
unconstitutional effect of advancing religion 80 Tax-based support
from the charitable deduction may qualify as incidental for
establishment clause purposes because of the requirement of taxpayer
cost in all charitable contributions. Tax benefits can be distinguished
from simple government appropriations because the government only
partially funds a religious organization with tax-based aid.
As long as tax rates remain below 100%, tax benefits in the form
of deductions 281 require that taxpayers incur some after-tax economic
cost in order to choose how to allocate government funds328 For
example, for a taxpayer with a marginal rate of 28%, the government
chips in 28 cents for each 72 cents that the taxpayer contributes to

charity. While much has been made of the government's contribution
of 28%, the significance of the taxpayer's required contribution of
72% has been little considered. 283 This requirement of individual cost

distinguishes the tax expenditure method of funding religious
organizations that we have in current law from both a taxpayer
277. See Sharon L. Worthing, The Internal Revenue Service as a Monitor of Church
Institutions: The Excessive Entanglement Problem, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 929, 947-48

(1977).
278. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (majority belief that the exemption produced less
entanglement). Cf Judith C. Miles, Beyond Bob Jones: Toward the Elimination of
Governmental Subsidy of DiscriminationBy Religious Institutions, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.

J. 31, 55-58 (1985) (arguing that the exemption for religious organizations should be
repealed to avoid the entanglement necessary in enforcing the antidiscrimination policy
upheld in Bob Jones).

279. See Rosenberger v. Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
280. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1979)
(allowing state reimbursement to sectarian schools for the costs of administering statemandated exams).
281. Credits, which generally allow taxpayers to credit only a percentage of expenses
against tax, also require that taxpayers incur some economic cost.
282. A potential exception to this is the deduction allowed under current law for the
fair market value of appreciated property, despite the exclusion of the built-in gain on
such property from the donor's income. When marginal tax rates exceeded 50%, it was
possible for a taxpayer to shift the entire cost of a donation to the government.
283. But see Levmore, supra note 228.
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designation system in which individuals could direct government
funds to their favorite charities at no cost to themselves and a system
of direct government grants determined by the legislature.
In the context of aid to religious organizations, individual cost is
significant if it transforms the government's subsidy into incidental
support. If one takes the perspective of the individual taxpayer or the
exempt organization, 4 then the level of the taxpayers' support
compared to the level of the government's support may make the
government's share seem small enough to be incidental. The smaller
the government's share of support, the less visible is the
governmental presence in the organization, and the less control over
the organization the government can wield. One can argue that these
limits on governmental involvement may prevent unconstitutional
levels of government entanglement with religious organizations and
may also weaken the message of connection between church and state
that full government support would imply. 285
However, the argument that individual cost minimizes the
government's role enough to make government support of religion
incidental is problematic. Focusing on the resources of the
organization may be insufficiently sensitive to the interests protected
by the establishment clause. Because establishment clause analysis is
designed to prevent the government from having too close a
relationship with religion, the appropriate perspective from which to
determine acceptability under that clause must be the government's
perspective. From that perspective, it appears that the taxpayer's cost
should not be significant at all; the relative support provided by the
private and public sectors is not as significant as the overall level of
public support and the government's goals in providing that support.
That, of course, is exactly the issue posed by direct spending
programs that aid religion, even those that require no cost to the
individual. Whether the government's support is merely incidental
to the government's purpose, not in
must be determined in relation 286
relation to the support of others.
Another argument for the incidental nature of tax-based support
to religious organizations may stem from the indirectness of tax-based
support327 All tax benefits are indirect in the sense that the
284. See Zelinsky, supra note 19 at 409 (suggesting that the equivalence of tax benefits
and direct expenditures may depend on the perspective from which the issue is analyzed).
285. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 694-700. (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)
286. For example, government support for services for the homeless that happen to
support church-based soup kitchens or subsidies for parents who incur private school
tuition costs would involve the same analysis regardless of the tax-based nature of the
support or the level of co-payments made by individuals.
287. In distinguishing constitutional textbook loans from unconstitutional equipment
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government does not directly disburse funds for any particular
programs, but rather refrains from collecting tax that would otherwise
be paid.n 8 The subsidy that religious organizations receive under the
charitable contribution deduction is also indirect in another way: the
subsidy flows directly to the contributor, rather than the religious
organization, and the contributor can choose to pass that subsidy on
or keep it. In the case of the charitable contribution deduction, the
incidence of the tax benefit often falls on someone other than the
taxpayer who claims the benefit 289 because the contributor saves tax
by virtue of the deduction and chooses whether to adjust the
contributed amount to account for the savings.

For example, if T would contribute $100 to her church without
the charitable contribution deduction, and she is in the 28% tax
bracket, she may decide to contribute $100, with the deduction
reducing her after-tax cost of the contribution to $72. She also may
gross up her contribution by the tax savings so that she continues to
bear a $100 after-tax cost for the gift. In that case, her contribution
would be $139.290 Whether she adjusts her contribution for the tax
savings depends on whether she is responsive to the tax deductionher elasticity of charitable giving.291 If the charitable deduction
causes her to increase her contribution by at least the amount of tax
savings to her-if the elasticity of giving is equal to or greater than

one92-then her tax savings is transferred to the exempt recipients.
loans, the Supreme Court noted that the books were loaned to the students, while the
equipment was loaned to the schools. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,362 (1975).
288. It has been argued that tax-based support is not indirect in the sense that the
economic benefit flows directly from the government to the recipient organizations,
without any third party intermediary who actually receives the funds. See Brown, supra
note 117, at 106 n.52. This is sometimes true. For example, where the tax benefit is an
exemption from tax that relieves the taxpayer from the burden of taxation. Such was the
case in Walz itself, which involved a property tax exemption for church-owned property.
There was no intermediary in that case, as there is in the case of the charitable
contribution deduction.
289. An example outside the charitable-contribution context that isolates the incidence
of the benefit may help clarify this idea: if a tax deduction for people who install energysaving devices in their homes allows the producers of those devices to raise the price of the
devices so that the entire tax savings claimed by the users is offset by the increase in price,
then the real economic benefit of the tax provision flows to the manufacturers, rather than
to the users. Congress may decide that this is the most effective method for encouraging
manufacturers to produce these devices. The tax benefit is accurately described as
"indirect" because the tax dollars foregone by the government are transferred to the
manufacturers through the users.
290. If she contributes $139 and takes a deduction, she saves $39 in taxes (139 x 28% =
39), for an after-tax cost of $100.
291. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE
GIVING 33,274 (1985) and Gergen, supranote 126, at 1406.
292. This is not a high elasticity and empirical studies suggest that the elasticity is
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Only in that case does the foregone revenue benefit the organization.
Because contributors may decide to keep the tax savings of their
contributions for themselves, the government benefits that flow to
organizations may be considered incidental to the government's
decision to reduce the tax burden on contributors.
For establishment clause analysis, the indirect nature of tax
support under the charitable contribution deduction may be
significant because both the fact and amount of government support
is contingent on choices made by the nominal taxpayers and the
market's distribution of the economic benefit. Because of these two
contingencies, the provision of indirect benefits implies a significantly
lower level of government intent, control and entanglement than
either direct spending or tax benefits that flow directly. Indirect
benefits do not imply government support and approval to the same
extent as benefits that emanate straight from the government.
At the same time that the indirectness of benefits argues for
greater establishment clause acceptability, indirectness also raises
special establishment concerns. One consequence of the indirect
nature of the charitable contribution deduction is that it constitutes
unconditional support for the ultimate beneficiary organizations.
Tax-based support provided through the charitable contribution
deduction is unrestricted in purpose and can be used directly for
support of sectarian functions that the Court has never allowed the
government to finance. For this reason, tax-based support is unlike
the Title I support allowed in Agostini,293 the sign-language
interpreter allowed in Zobrest,294 and the secular books loaned in
School District No. L.295 The argument made in Agostini - that the
support provided by the state did not relieve a burden from the
religious schools because the individual schools simply would not
have provided the services at all - cannot be made in the tax context.
The funds made available to religious organizations by the tax
deductibility of contributions are available to support all the ordinary
functions of those organizations. The fungibility of money prevents
any tax-based subsidy, which is always in money, from benefiting only
a narrow purpose. When the government provides funds, it frees up
other funds to be used according to the recipient's discretion. Thus,
all the functions of the organization are indirectly benefited by any
probably greater than one in absolute value. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 291, at 274. If
the elasticity of charitable giving is no greater than one, then the charitable contribution
deduction is providing no incentive for taxpayers to increase their after-tax contributions,
and the provision is not a very effective way to increase public support for charity. See
Gergen, supra note 126, at 1412.
293. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)
294. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
295. Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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tax-based subsidy, and the government cannot limit its financial
support to secular purposes. This aspect of tax-based funding
suggests that such funding might be less acceptable under the
establishment clause than in-kind, secular-purpose aid to religious
institutions that the Supreme Court has approved.
In sum, this section has described how courts should approach
tax-based aid to religious organizations. Even though it is not entirely
clear whether tax-based aid to religious organizations is
constitutionally acceptable where economically equivalent direct aid
would be prohibited, it is clear that the economic equivalence of tax
benefits and direct spending is not the most important factor to
consider in establishment clause analysis. The establishment clause is
concerned with government entanglement with religion and the
government's need to achieve secular purposes without primarily
promoting or inhibiting religion. Economic equivalence of tax
benefits and direct spending programs is not critical to these
concerns, 296 but other distinctions between tax benefits and direct
spending programs are. While reasonable people can differ about the
proper constitutional outcome, in considering the constitutionality of
tax provisions under the establishment clause, courts should consider
the purpose of the statute and its administration, the practical manner
of carrying out the program, the indirect nature of tax-based support,
and the significance of taxpayer choice.
L. Beyond Constitutionality
One of the important lessons that the proponents of tax
expenditure analysis have taught is that the tax law is not simply a
revenue raising tool. They have emphasized this fact by looking to
the incentive provisions in the Code. But the lesson is well-learned
for every provision in the Code. Even if the Code were simply a
revenue raising tool-if we enacted a model income tax proposed by
experts2 97-it would still contain numerous policy judgments. The
basis on which we choose to raise revenue and the people from whom
we choose to raise it reflects some conception of fairness and justice.
This Article has attempted to examine the constitutionality of tax
benefits under the equal protection and establishment clauses,
considering the doctrines developed by the Supreme Court, and, in
the case of equal protection, alternative doctrinal approaches that
would also be possible under the Constitution. Because of the tax

296. Economic equivalence could be significant under the effects prong of Lemon. See
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
297. Such as that in BRADFORD, supra note 62 or TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNEsS,
SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 98.
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law's increasing role in federal policy, the constitutional questions are
becoming more important. At the same time, the theoretical
questions underlying the constitutional issues become harder to
ignore by isolating taxation from constitutional norms.
It has been suggested that both the anti-discrimination and antisubordination approaches to equal protection reflect conflicting
notions of the meaning of equality. The anti-discrimination approach
reflects a formal understanding, while the anti-subordination
298 Most of
approach reflects a substantive understanding of equality.
this Article is about how tax policy-in particular, tax expenditure
analysis-should affect constitutional law. But these conflicting
approaches to the equal protection clause, regardless of whether they
are good interpretations of the equal protection clause, provide
helpful insight for thinking about tax policy.
The anti-discrimination approach in equal protection analysis
parallels the horizontal equity approach in traditional tax policy.
They are both concerned with the government treating like-situated
people alike, without inquiring into the historical, social and
institutional questions that surround what it means to be alike. While
formal justice in this sense may be all that the Constitution requires
for equal protection, and it may be desirable for the Constitution to
be limited in this way, tax policy's aspirations can be more expansive.
Tax policy can be about defining and achieving substantive equality,
even if it is beyond what the Constitution requires, and even though it
requires explicitly linking tax policy to ideas that are outside its
traditional borders. Horizontal equity, and the income measure on
which it is based, sells the tax law short of the potential it has for
contributing to a meaningful vision of social equality. 299 The richness
of the scholarship on the equal protection clause highlights the
300
narrowness of the tax policy inquiry.
This Article tries to help situate tax policy more firmly in
broader government policy by examining how courts should approach

298. See WEST, supra note 231, at 29.
299. Some commentators have argued that horizontal equity is meaningless. See Louis
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Searchof a Principle,42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989).
But see Richard A. Musgrave, HorizontalEquity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990);
Paul R. McDaniel and James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
MusgravelKaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX RaV. 607 (1993). Those who have argued for
content in the horizontal equity norm have focused on a narrow set of tax-insular factors.
See Deborah H. Schenk, The Role of Equality in Allocating the Tax Burden (paper
presented at N.Y.U. Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, April 17, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
300. There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supranote 104; Thomas D.
Griffith, Should Tax Norms Be Abandoned?: Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis & the
Taxation of PersonalInjury Recoveries, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1115 (1993).
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a fundamentally tax-centered axiom in deciding whether tax
provisions violate constitutional norms. If tax expenditure analysis is
constitutionalized by courts so that tax expenditures are always
treated as the equivalent of direct expenditures, at first glance, tax
policy appears to be integrated with social policy because
governmental action is subject to consistent review, regardless of the
tax context or expenditure context of that action. However, on closer
examination, the constitutionalization of tax expenditure analysis
reinforces the separateness of tax policy by limiting the legal
consequences of different tax provisions depending on their
categorization as income-defining or not.
Even if like taxpayers are taxed alike, as the horizontal equity
norm instructs, the tax system may not contribute to any larger vision
of equality in society. The increasing importance of the tax law as
one of the few vessels that can still be legitimately filled with federal
policy301 places pressure on the traditionally insular perspective of tax
policy, which treats tax policy as dependent only upon the internal
structure and coherence of the tax law. 302 The tax law should be a
tool for achieving substantive equality because it is powerful, its
effects are widespread, and its medium is money, the root of so much
social inequality. As the tax law takes over the public agenda, it must
better serve the fundamental ideals of government, even if they are
beyond the Constitution.

301. For example, at the same time that it considered expanding education IRA's,
Congress also considered cutting direct spending on education. See Katharine Q. Seelye,
Panel Approves Deep Cuts in Programs Championed by Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1998, at A17 col. 1.
302. The Basic Income Tax casebooks generally reflect this approach, by spending
considerable time on the definition of income. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ &
DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d

ed. 1995). See also COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (Joseph A. Pechman, ed. 1977).
Tax policy was not always understood this way. See John Stuart Mill, Principles of
PoliticalEconomy, Bk. V.II. (originally published in 1848) (considering taxation as part of
larger political and social structure).

